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 Charter Remedies and Jurisdiction 
to Grant Them: The Evolution of 
Section 24(1) and Section 52(1)  
Debra M. McAllister* 
Without effective remedies, the law becomes an empty symbol; full of 
sound and fury but signifying nothing… 
Chief Justice Beverley M. McLachlin** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A right is only as good as the remedy; this adage is as true of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 19821 (“the Charter”) as it is 
of any other area of the law. However, many courts and administrative 
                                                                                                                                
* Senior Counsel, Department of Justice Canada, Ontario Regional Office, Toronto. 
The views expressed in this paper are mine alone; I do not purport to represent, in any way, 
the views of the Department of Justice or the Government of Canada. I presented a shorter 
predecessor of this paper entitled “Doucet-Boudreau Judicial Enforcement of Court Orders: 
Confrontation or Cooperation?” at the Osgoode 2003 Constitutional Cases Conference on 
April 2, 2004. Further, some portions of this article initially appeared in my publications 
entitled: “Mackin: Of Sterile Rules and Real People” (2003) 21 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 339; 
Taking the Charter to Court: A Practitioners Analysis, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1998) 
c. 16.1, 16.4; “Administrative Tribunals and the Charter: A Tale of Form Conquering Sub-
stance” [1992] L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 131; and “The Role of Tribunals in Constitutional 
Adjudication” [1991-1992] 1 N.J.C.L. 25. 
** Extract from McLachlin C.J., “The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary?” (1991) 
29 Alta. L. Rev. 540 (paper delivered on October 16, 1990, for the Weir Memorial Lecture at 
the University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta). Although McLachlin C.J. was not the Chief 
Justice when the speech was delivered, I have referred to her throughout this paper by her 
current designation. All other references to judges are “as they then were”; that is, by their 
designation at the time they wrote a specific decision or paper. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
tribunals that routinely deal with Charter issues do not have authority to 
grant effective remedies for breach of Charter rights. The issue of what 
remedies are available to rectify a breach of Charter rights, and the ques-
tion of what bodies have jurisdiction to determine whether the Charter 
has been infringed, are intertwined and have been controversial and 
central to Charter litigation from the beginning.  
The jurisprudence on many constitutional issues has evolved so 
quickly since the Charter came into force in 1982, that some rulings in 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s earliest Charter decisions have already 
been reversed or substantially revised.2 However, this apparent growth 
in our understanding of rights can be tested by examining the remedies 
that have developed, since the remedy is the “bottom line” that matters 
most to the claimant at the end of the day. In other words, while it is 
certainly important that the courts have taken an expansive approach to 
equality rights, this may not matter to an individual who cannot get a 
remedy that fully and meaningfully vindicates her section 15 rights. The 
issue addressed in this paper is how far have we come with respect to 
remedies for breaches of Charter rights? To paraphrase McLachlin C.J., 
do we have effective remedies? If not, we risk the Charter becoming an 
empty symbol. 
This question cannot be answered without exploring the twin issue 
of jurisdiction. The two constitutional provisions that deal with both 
                                                                                                                                
2 See, for example, Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova 
Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54 
[hereinafter “Martin”], which made important changes to earlier jurisprudence on the juris-
diction of administrative tribunals to decide Charter issues, and specifically overruled Cooper 
v. Canada (Human Rights Commission) (sub nom. Bell v. Canada (Human Rights Commis-
sion)), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, [1996] S.C.J. No. 115 [hereinafter “Cooper”] to the extent of any 
inconsistency. See also the development of the s. 15(1) test beginning with the 1989 trilogy of 
Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6; Refer-
ence re Workers’ Compensation Act, 1983 (Newfoundland) (sub nom. Reference re Sections 
32 & 34 of the Workers’ Compensation Act 1983 (Newfoundland)), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922, 
[1989] S.C.J. No. 35; and R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, [1989] S.C.J. No. 47; followed 
by the 1995 trilogy of Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44; Egan v. 
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, [1995] S.C.J. NO. 43 [hereinafter “Egan”], and Thibaudeau v. 
Canada (sub nom. Thibaudeau v. R.; Thibaudeau v. Minister of National Revenue), [1995] 2 
S.C.R. 627, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42; and ultimately stabilized in the 1999 decision in Law v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12. 
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jurisdiction and remedial authority are section 24(1) of the Charter and 
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,3 which provide as follows: 
24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, 
have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent 
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate 
and just in the circumstances. 
52(1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and 
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, 
to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. 
Not only are jurisdiction and remedies addressed in the same sec-
tions of the Constitution; they are bound together in practice. A Charter 
claimant must consider what remedy is needed, and what forum has 
jurisdiction to grant that remedy. Conversely, an individual may be 
required by statute to appear before a court or tribunal that lacks juris-
diction to grant an effective remedy.  
The Charter has posed unique challenges for the courts with respect 
to both their decision-making process and their remedial authority that 
did not exist before our rights were constitutionally entrenched. These 
challenges, which impact upon the relationship between the courts and 
the legislative and executive branches of government, were discussed in 
McLachlin C.J.’s paper entitled “The Charter: A New Role for the Judi-
ciary,”4 which was delivered for the Weir Memorial Lecture at the Uni-
versity of Alberta in 1990. I begin with a summary of this paper, and of 
the academic commentary and case law on the dialogue theory5 of Char-
ter development, since both provide insight into the relationship be-
tween the judiciary and the other branches of government in the Charter 
era. This is the context within which remedial and jurisdictional issues 
will be explored.  
                                                                                                                                
3 I do not attempt to deal with the entire body of jurisprudence on s. 24(2) of the 
Charter in this article.  
4 (1991) 29 No. 3 Alta. L. Rev. 540 . 
5 The dialogue theory was first proposed by Hogg & Bushell in an article entitled 
“The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights 
Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 [hereinafter “Hogg & 
Bushell”]. 
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I begin this exploration with a review of the Supreme Court’s early 
decisions that articulated the foundational principles for the interpretation 
of section 24(1) and section 52(1): R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (1985)6 
and R. v. Mills (1986).7 These cases establish that the Charter does not 
expand jurisdiction or create remedies. Further, section 52(1) applies 
when legislation is challenged, while section 24(1) provides personal 
remedies for government action that infringes Charter rights. I also 
review the cases which state that a remedy under section 24(1) is not 
generally available in conjunction with a section 52(1) remedy: 
Schachter v. Canada (1985),8 Guimond v. Quebec (Attorney General) 
(1996),9 and Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance) (sub nom. 
Rice v. New Brunswick) (2002).10  
Next, I address the guidelines provided by the Supreme Court for 
granting section 52(1) remedies, which are set out in Schachter (1985)11 
and Vriend v. Alberta (1998).12 I also deal with the jurisdiction to grant 
these remedies, which was considered in a series of cases culminating in 
Martin (2003).13 Similarly, I explore the principles for granting a rem-
edy under section 24(1) that were established in Doucet-Boudreau v. 
Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) (2003),14 and jurisdiction under 
section 24(1) as it has been explained in the case law, particularly 
Dunedin (2001)15 and Doucet-Boudreau SCC.16 
My thesis is that there have been substantial developments in the 
principles and guidelines regarding both remedies for breach of Charter 
rights, and the jurisdiction to grant them. However, we do not yet have a 
                                                                                                                                
6 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17 [hereinafter “Big M”]. 
7 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39 [hereinafter “Mills”]. 
8 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68 [hereinafter “Schachter”]. 
9 [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347, [1996] S.C.J. No. 91 [hereinafter “Guimond”]. 
10 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, [2002] S.C.J. No. 13 [hereinafter “Mackin”]. 
11 Supra, note 8. 
12 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29 [hereinafter “Vriend ”]. 
13 Supra, note 2. 
14 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, [2003] S.C.J. No. 63 [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau SCC”]. I 
have distinguished throughout this paper between the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 
Doucet-Boudreau, and those of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal. 
15 Ontario v. 974649 Ontario Inc. (sub nom. R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc.), [2001] 3 
S.C.R. 575, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81 [hereinafter “Dunedin”]. See also the companion case of R. 
v. Hynes, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 623, [2001] S.C.J. No. 82. 
16 Supra, note 14.  
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cohesive set of principles that will ensure that a person whose Charter 
rights have been infringed will be granted a just and appropriate remedy 
in an expeditious manner. There are gaps in the law, particularly where 
statutory courts and administrative tribunals are concerned; these bodies 
may have the duty to abide by and apply the Constitution, but many do 
not have authority to grant a remedy that will do justice to the claimant. 
The courts cannot provide a complete solution, since the assignment of 
jurisdiction is entirely a matter for the legislatures. However, the courts 
can point out the problem and urge the legislatures to take up the issue 
in a manner that respects the division of powers among the branches of 
government as it has developed since the Charter was enacted.17 
II.  THE ROLE OF COURTS UNDER THE CHARTER 
Chief Justice McLachlin delivered the Weir Memorial Lecture18 in 
1990, eight years after the Charter came into force.19 She discussed the 
fundamental changes the Charter made to the role of Canadian courts, 
and how the courts might deal with these changes. She addressed the 
difficulties in the decision-making process that flowed from lack of 
precedents, the “open-textured” language of the Charter, and the need 
for value-based decisions. She also considered remedies, and how the 
courts could enforce the new range of Charter rights and freedoms. In 
the pre-Charter era there was generally no difficulty enforcing court 
orders; legal disputes were between individuals, the Crown was su-
preme, and the courts were seen as an independent emanation of the 
Crown. However, under the Charter the issues are between individuals 
and the state, and the concern is how the courts can ensure their orders 
will be enforced when they decide that legislation or state action is 
                                                                                                                                
17 I wish to acknowledge and thank Professor Marilyn Pilkington for this suggestion, 
which we discussed at the Osgoode 2003 Constitutional Cases Conference on April 2, 2004. 
Professor Pilkington and I appeared along with Professor Kent Roach on a panel addressing 
the Doucet-Boudreau decision. I would also like to thank Professor Roach for his very helpful 
comments on recent trends in remedies, particularly the focus on discretion. 
18 Supra, note 4. 
19 All provisions of the Charter except s. 15 came into force in 1982. By virtue of 
s. 32(2) of the Charter, s. 15 came into force three years later, on April 17, 1985. 
6  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
unconstitutional. “The answer,” McLachlin C.J. said, “must be found in 
respect, tradition and constitutional convention.”20  
Her comments were made against the background of the American 
constitutional experience. Although there is no express authority for 
judicial review, the United States Supreme Court developed this power 
beginning with the landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison.21 When 
“the Court began taking on an activist approach, particularly when [it] 
attempted to fashion remedies in civil rights cases, it met resistance and 
sometimes open defiance from lower courts, the bureaucracy and the 
executive.”22 The Court’s school desegregation decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education23 provides a vivid example. The bureaucracy was 
uncooperative, and the government failed to provide the funds needed to 
implement the decision. Congress, the Senate and state legislatures 
responded by enacting statutes that complied with the letter but not the 
substance of the decision, or by passing constitutional amendments. 
Legislators verbally attacked judges, Congress altered the Court’s man-
date, and presidents attempted to “stack” the Court with politically 
aligned appointees.  
Some lower courts avoided or defied the Supreme Court’s decision. 
At the opposite extreme, judges responded by “giving detailed, literal 
orders, virtually taking over the administration of schools or dictating 
the development of desegregated housing. The result was judge as ad-
ministrator… making day to day operational decisions in the running of 
a school — down to what kind of tennis balls to order in one case …”24 
Although the courts ultimately prevailed, a high price was paid in delay, 
frustration, additional costs, strained relationships between lower courts 
and the Supreme Court, and hostility between the legislative and judicial 
branches of government. Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that the 
verdict on judicial administration was mixed at best, which made it an 
alternative that Canada should not lightly embrace. 
Further, she pointed out that there are fundamental differences be-
tween the American and Canadian constitutional systems that should 
avoid these difficulties. First, Canada’s courts have explicit authority to 
                                                                                                                                
20 Supra, note 4, at 549.  
21 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
22 Supra, note 4, at 550. 
23 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
24 Supra, note 4, at 552-53. 
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review legislation and government action, and to grant remedies under 
section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and section 24 of the Charter. 
These powers were granted to the courts by the legislatures, which re-
tained ultimate control through the legislative override in section 33 of 
the Charter. Another major difference is the tradition of references that 
permit Parliament or the legislatures to ask a court’s advice on legal 
issues. Although the results are not binding, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions on references have always been followed. Chief Justice McLachlin 
wrote that this was an example of “a long-standing tradition of commu-
nication between the executive and judicial branches”25 of government. 
However, she considered the most significant difference from the 
United States to be the Canadian tradition of judicial restraint and coop-
eration between the judiciary and the legislatures. Judicial restraint 
means that judges normally answer only the question that is directly 
before them. “Broad sweeping directives have not been part of our judi-
cial history… [The Supreme Court] has generally refrained from activ-
ism where it was not necessary to do so.”26 This is based on the division 
of powers and respect among the branches of government. Professor 
Hogg explained that “…if a case can be decided on a narrow constitu-
tional ground or a wide ground, the narrow ground is to be preferred… 
the general idea is that a proper deference to the other branches of gov-
ernment makes it wise for the courts, as far as possible, to frame their 
decisions in ways that do not intrude gratuitously on the powers of the 
other branches.”27 Similarly, McLachlin C.J. wrote that our courts “re-
main concerned not to trench too much on the legislative role.” Even 
though the Court’s function under the Charter is necessarily more activ-
ist, it maintains “the attitude of judicial restraint and respect for Parlia-
ment and the Legislatures.”28 
The underlying concern is that even though the Canadian Constitu-
tion does not establish a strict division of powers between the legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial branches of government, rules have 
developed over time to define the jurisdictional boundary between the 
executive and legislative branches on one hand, and the courts on the 
                                                                                                                                
25 Id., at 556.  
26 Id., at 555. 
27 Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997) 
Vol. 2, at 56-21. 
28 Supra, note 4, at 555. 
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other. Before the Charter, Canadian courts had limited authority to strike 
down laws that were ultra vires the powers of the enacting body. Today, 
they have jurisdiction to review legislation and government activities for 
compliance with a broad range of fundamental rights and freedoms. The 
question at the heart of the Weir Memorial Lecture is, what if the courts 
find a law invalid or hold that government activity is unconstitutional, 
and the government does nothing to rectify the situation?  
To take this concern a step further, it has been argued that the con-
stitutional balance between the courts and the legislatures has shifted; 
judicial appointees who are not accountable to the electorate have ven-
tured into the domain of the legislatures by striking down laws enacted 
by democratically chosen representatives of the people. The significance 
of this issue is reflected in the number of times the Supreme Court has 
responded to this allegation, beginning with its earliest Charter deci-
sions. The Court has repeatedly stated that Parliament and the legisla-
tures specifically assigned and entrusted adjudication of Charter issues 
to the judiciary.29  
For example, the majority in Vriend30 held that our elected represen-
tatives made deliberate choices to require the legislative and executive 
branches to perform their roles in conformity with the Charter. The 
same representatives made the courts the trustees of Charter rights and 
freedoms, with explicit authority to interpret these rights, resolve dis-
putes, and declare legislation invalid if it is unconstitutional.31 However, 
courts must not “second-guess legislatures and the executives … [or] 
make value judgments on what they regard as the proper policy choice; 
this is for the other branches… respect by the courts for the legislature 
and executive role is as important as ensuring that the other branches 
respect each others’ role and the role of the courts.”32 
                                                                                                                                
29 See, for example, Reference re s. 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) 
(sub nom. Reference re Constitutional Question Act (British Columbia), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 
[1985] S.C.J. No. 73, at 497, where Lamer J. stated that the courts had authority to review the 
content of laws in division of powers cases, and that our elected representatives “extended the 
scope of constitutional adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous 
responsibility.”  
30 Supra, note 12. The government argued that the Court was interfering with the legis-
lature’s choice not to include sexual orientation in the provincial human rights legislation. 
31 Id. 
32 Id., at 564-65, para. 136.  
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This relationship between the courts and the legislatures was de-
scribed by Professor Hogg and Allison Bushell as a dialogue33 in their 
1997 study of cases where laws were struck down by the Supreme Court 
for Charter violations. They concluded that, “[i]n the majority of cases, 
the Court’s ruling was followed by new legislation that accomplished 
the same legislative objective but with some new civil libertarian safe-
guards to accommodate the Court’s ruling.”34 They described this pat-
tern as a dialogue, meaning that “ss. 1 and 33 of the Charter … usually 
allow room for a legislative reaction to a Court decision, and a legisla-
tive reaction is indeed usually forthcoming.”35 Professor Hogg argues 
that judicial review under the Charter is not incompatible with democ-
racy, which requires more than simple majoritarian rule. “In a flourish-
ing democracy, the rights of individuals and minorities should be 
respected even against the wishes of a majority,”36 and the public dia-
logue that follows a court decision usually leads to a valid law with 
better rights protection. 
The dialogue theory has been adopted by the Supreme Court. The 
majority in Vriend held that “the Charter has given rise to a more dy-
namic interaction among the branches of governance”37 which enhances 
the democratic process. “In reviewing legislative enactments and execu-
tive decisions to ensure constitutional validity, the courts speak to the 
legislative and executive branches … most of the legislation held not to 
pass constitutional muster has been followed by new legislation de-
signed to accomplish similar objectives … By doing this, the legislature 
responds to the courts; hence the dialogue among the branches.”38 Each 
branch is accountable to the other through this process, which has en-
hanced democratic values.39 Further, the judicial branch must observe 
                                                                                                                                
33 Hogg & Bushell, supra, note 5. 
34 Hogg, “Dialogue and Democracy” in McAllister & Dodek, eds., The Charter at 
Twenty: Law and Practice 2002 (Toronto: Ontario Bar Association, 2003) 483, at 487. 
35 Id. 
36 Id., at 483. This point was also made in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 68, at para. 58. 
37 Supra, note 12, at 565, para. 138. 
38 Id.  
39 Id., at 566-67, paras. 139-42. 
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the boundaries of its institutional competence, and defer to legislatures 
in areas where they are better able to make policy decisions.40  
As McLachlin C.J. stated in the Weir Memorial Lecture, the courts 
must necessarily be more activist under the Charter. That activism was 
especially evident in cases where the Supreme Court ordered govern-
ments to rectify underinclusive laws41 and to expand health care pro-
grams.42 It was also apparent in Dunmore (2001)43 where the Court 
struck down legislation that repealed a law which brought historically 
excluded workers into the labour relations regime. In response to deci-
sions like this, legislatures have enacted new laws that achieve the same 
purpose, with added safeguards to protect Charter rights as interpreted 
by the courts. This dialogue relationship builds upon the tradition of 
judicial restraint and respect for the division of powers among the 
branches of government. It forms the essential context within which 
to consider remedies in Charter cases and the jurisdiction to grant 
them, especially the question whether Canadian courts should issue 
                                                                                                                                
40 M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 78-79, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23. See also R. v. 
Mills, supra, note 36, at para. 55. 
41 The clearest example is Vriend, supra, note 12, at 567-79, paras. 145-79, where Al-
berta repeatedly declined to add sexual orientation to the proscribed grounds of discrimina-
tion in its comprehensive anti-discrimination law. Indeed, the Alberta government indicated 
that it would not pass legislation to add sexual orientation to its human rights code, since the 
issue would be resolved through litigation. The Supreme Court, id., at 575-76, para. 171, took 
this as “an express invitation for the courts to read sexual orientation into the [Act]” if its 
exclusion violated the Charter. 
42 See Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 86 [hereinafter “Eldridge”], where the province failed to provide funding for sign 
language interpreters for deaf persons receiving medical services. See also the British Colum-
bia Court of Appeal decision in Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) 2002 BCCA 538, leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted (2003), 224 D.L.R. (4th) vi, 
[2002] B.C.J. No. 2258, where the Court ordered the province to fund a particular type of 
therapy for children with autism.  
43 See Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016, [2001] S.C.J. 
No. 87, where the majority held that to make freedom to organize meaningful, s. 2(d) may 
impose a positive obligation on the state to extend labour relations legislation to include 
unprotected groups where the excluded groups establish that they could not otherwise organ-
ize effectively. The minimum requirement in this case was to give agricultural workers the 
statutory freedom to organize under the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, and the 
protections that were essential for the meaningful exercise of the freedom to organize.  
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administrative injunctions similar to those granted by American courts 
in civil rights cases.44 
III.  BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR INTERPRETING  
SECTION 24(1) AND SECTION 52(1) 
The basic principles for interpretation of section 52(1) and section 
24(1) were set out in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.45 and R. v. Mills,46 
which were decided in 1985 and 1986 respectively. Both cases involved 
the jurisdiction of provincial criminal courts to grant remedies for 
breach of Charter rights. In Big M, a company was charged with selling 
goods in violation of Sunday closing legislation. The Provincial Court 
judge who presided at trial held the statute was unconstitutional, partly 
on the basis that it violated freedom of religion. In Mills, the issue was 
whether a Provincial Court judge sitting on a preliminary inquiry was a 
court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of granting a stay of 
proceedings to remedy the breach of the accused’s right to be tried 
within a reasonable time.  
The first significant point drawn from these decisions is found in 
Mills, where McIntyre J. commented that the jurisdiction of Canadian 
courts is fixed by the legislatures and Parliament, and is wholly outside 
the reach of the courts themselves. Since there are no jurisdictional 
provisions or remedies prescribed in the Constitution Act, 1982, McIn-
tyre J. concluded that the Charter “was not intended to turn the Cana-
dian legal system upside down. What is required rather is that it be fitted 
into the existing scheme of Canadian legal procedure. There is no need 
for special procedures and rules to give it full and adequate effect.”47 He 
added that “… s. 24(1) does not create courts of competent jurisdiction, 
but merely vests additional powers in courts which are already found to 
be competent independently of the Charter.”48 
The second basic principle that emerges from these early decisions 
is set out in the majority decision of Dickson J. in Big M. He granted a 
                                                                                                                                
44 The appropriate roles of courts and legislatures was explored in greater detail in 
Doucet-Boudreau SCC, supra, note 14, a point to which I will return later in this paper. 
45 Supra, note 6. 
46 Supra, note 7. 
47 Id., at 952-53. 
48 Id., at 960. 
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declaration under section 52(1) that the Sunday closing legislation was 
invalid, and dismissed the charges under section 24(1). He held that 
while section 24(1) establishes a remedy for individuals whose Charter 
rights have been infringed, there is no need to resort to this provision if 
legislation is challenged. Section 52 “sets out the fundamental principle 
… that the Constitution is supreme. The undoubted corollary … is that 
no one can be convicted of an offence under an unconstitutional 
law…”49 While the Provincial Court could not grant a declaration of 
invalidity under section 24(1), it could rely on the principle of suprem-
acy of the Constitution set out in section 52(1) and dismiss charges laid 
under an unconstitutional law.  
The third principle regarding the interpretation of these provisions is 
articulated in Mills. The accused did not challenge legislation; rather, 
the actions of government officials resulted in the breach of his right to 
trial within a reasonable time. Consequently, section 52(1) was not 
engaged, since there was no legislation that could be inconsistent with 
the Constitution of Canada, and the accused had to rely on section 24(1) 
for a remedy. Justice McIntyre stated that “… a court is competent if it 
has jurisdiction, conferred by statute, over the person and the subject 
matter in question and, in addition, has authority to make the order 
sought.”50 Therefore, if there is no challenge to legislation, section 24(1) 
will govern, and the test in Mills of jurisdiction over the person and the 
subject matter, as well as authority to grant the order sought, will apply.  
In summary, Big M and Mills establish that the Charter does not ex-
pand jurisdiction or create remedies, and that Charter issues must be 
raised within the existing legal framework. Secondly, section 52(1) 
codifies the principle that laws which are inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion are invalid. It applies when legislation is challenged, and when an 
accused is charged under an invalid law. Third, section 24(1) provides 
personal remedies for government action that infringes Charter-
protected rights. This provision must be relied upon when there is no 
legislation at issue. To qualify as a section 24(1) court of competent 
                                                                                                                                
49 Supra, note 6, at 313. This approach to criminal charges under unconstitutional leg-
islation was established before the Charter was enacted. See, for example, R. v. Boggs (sub 
nom. R. v. Akey), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 49 and R. v. Westendorp, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43. 
50 Mills, supra, note 7, at 960. Justice McIntyre adopted the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
approach in R. v. Morgentaler (1984), 41 C.R. (3d) 262, at 271 (Ont. C.A.). The other judges 
agreed. See Lamer J., at 890 and La Forest J., at 971. 
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jurisdiction, the decision maker must have authority over the person and 
the subject matter, as well as power to grant the remedy sought. 
IV.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 24(1) AND  
SECTION 52(1) 
While these early statements provided a starting point for the inter-
pretation of section 52(1) and section 24(1), the relationship between 
these provisions was not clarified until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Schachter51 was released in 1992. The Court held that a remedy under 
section 24(1) is not generally available in conjunction with a section 
52(1) remedy.52 The subsequent decisions in Guimond (1996)53 and 
Mackin (2002)54 established that concurrent remedies under these provi-
sions will be available only where the government conduct amounts to 
bad faith or abuse of process. The Supreme Court recently commented 
on this line of authorities in R. v. Demers.55 
Schachter was a challenge to the maternity and parental benefits 
available under the unemployment insurance regime. The legislation 
provided maternity benefits for biological mothers, and parental benefits 
for adoptive fathers or mothers, but no comparable benefits for biologi-
cal fathers. The trial judge found the legislation violated section 15(1) 
equality rights, and issued a suspended declaration under section 24(1), 
that biological and adoptive parents were entitled to the same benefits. 
The legislation was amended before the appeal was heard in the Su-
preme Court, to provide parental benefits for biological parents on the 
same basis as adoptive parents, but for a reduced period of time. The 
sole issue was the remedies available for breach of Charter rights, par-
ticularly whether courts could rectify a constitutional defect by reading 
words into invalid legislation.  
Chief Justice Lamer, writing for the majority, enumerated the reme-
dies that are available under section 52(1), and articulated a method for 
determining which remedy to grant in a particular case; these aspects of 
                                                                                                                                
51 Supra, note 8. 
52 The Court also set out guidelines for applying s. 52(1), which are addressed later in 
this paper. 
53 Supra, note 9. 
54 Supra, note 10. 
55  2004 SCC 46, [2004] S.C.J. No. 43, released June 30, 2004 [hereinafter “Demers’]. 
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the judgment are discussed below. He also held that a section 24(1) 
remedy may be available when section 52 is not engaged because the 
legislation is valid, but action taken under the law infringes a person’s 
Charter rights.56 He added that a personal remedy under section 24(1) 
“will rarely be available in conjunction with an action under s. 52 … 
Ordinarily, where a provision is declared unconstitutional and immedi-
ately struck down pursuant to s. 52, that will be the end of the matter. 
No retroactive s. 24 remedy will be available.”57 Further, if a declaration 
of invalidity is temporarily suspended, a section 24 remedy generally 
will not be granted because it would duplicate the relief flowing from 
the suspended declaration. 
This issue was touched upon in the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision 
in Guimond. The plaintiff commenced a class action seeking a declara-
tion that a law was invalid under section 52, and damages for breach of 
the constitutional rights of persons who had been sentenced to impris-
onment for regulatory offences under the legislation when they failed to 
pay fines. Justice Gonthier, writing for the unanimous Court, relied on 
the common law principle that the Crown is not liable for damages 
arising from the enactment of laws which are later found to be unconsti-
tutional.58 He added that “[a]lthough it cannot be said that damages can 
never be obtained following a declaration of constitutional invalidity, it 
is true, as a general rule, that an action for damages under s. 24(1) of the 
Charter cannot be coupled with a declaratory action for invalidity under 
s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”59 The claim for damages in this 
case was based on a bare allegation of constitutional invalidity, which 
did not warrant a departure from the general rule. 
The relationship between section 24(1) and section 52(1) was ad-
dressed at greater length in the Supreme Court’s decision in Mackin60 
released in 2002. Justice Gonthier, writing for the majority, declared 
                                                                                                                                
56 Supra, note 8, at 719. See also Eldridge, supra, note 42, at 643-44, para. 20. 
57 Schachter, id., at 720. 
58 Supra, note 9, at para. 15. The classic statements of the common law principle are 
set out in Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Winnipeg (City), [1971] S.C.R. 957 [hereinafter “Wel-
bridge”] and Central Canada Potash Co. v. Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42 [hereinafter 
“Central Canada Potash”]. Justice Gonthier found in Guimond that the “claim of right” 
defence to tort claims applied equally to claims made under s. 24(1) of the Charter. 
59 Guimond, id., at para. 19. 
60 Supra, note 10. 
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legislation invalid on the basis that it infringed judicial independence by 
eliminating the office of supernumerary judges in the Provincial Courts 
of New Brunswick, and replacing them with a panel of retired judges. 
He rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for damages under section 24(1) of the 
Charter, based on the general public law rule that “absent conduct that is 
clearly wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power, the courts will not 
award damages for the harm suffered as a result of the mere enactment 
or application of a law that is subsequently declared to be unconstitu-
tional.”61 Put another way, “[i]nvalidity of governmental action, without 
more, clearly should not be a basis for liability for harm caused by the 
action.”62  
Justice Gonthier relied on Guimond for the proposition that since 
the Charter was enacted, a plaintiff could theoretically seek compensa-
tory and punitive damages under section 24(1) of the Charter.63 How-
ever, the common law doctrine of limited immunity created a balance 
between constitutional rights and effective government. He concluded 
that laws must be given their full force and effect until they are declared 
invalid, and damages may be awarded only if government conduct un-
der such laws is clearly wrong, in bad faith, or an abuse of power.64 
While he could not completely rule out the possibility of damages being 
awarded following a declaration of invalidity, he held that as a general 
matter “an action for damages brought under s. 24(1) of the Charter 
cannot be combined with an action for a declaration of invalidity based 
on s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”65 
There was no evidence to suggest that when the government 
eliminated the office of supernumerary judge, it “acted negligently, 
in bad faith or by abusing its powers,”66 or that it “displayed negli-
gence, bad faith or wilful blindness with respect to its constitutional 
                                                                                                                                
61 Id., at para. 78, citing Welbridge and Central Canada Potash, both supra, note 58. 
62 Mackin, id., citing Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, vol. 3 (1958) at 487. Justice 
Gonthier also relied on an administrative law text by Dussault & Borgeat, Administrative 
Law: A Treatise, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) Vol. 5, at 177, which states that a legisla-
ture “cannot be held liable for anything it does in exercising its legislative powers. The law is 
the source of duty [and] it is hard to imagine that [a legislature] can as the lawmaker be held 
accountable for harm caused to an individual following the enactment of legislation.” 
63 Mackin, id., at para. 79. 
64 Id., citing Crown Trust Co. v. Ontario (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 41 (Ont. Div. Ct.). 
65 Mackin, id., at para. 81. 
66 Id., at para. 82. 
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obligations…”67 The legislation came into force more than two years 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in the Provincial Court Judges 
Reference68 substantially changed the law on institutional independence 
of the judiciary. The failure of the Minister of Justice to refer the Bill69 
to a legislative Committee, as he had promised, had “no probative value 
as to whether … the legislation was enacted wrongly, for ulterior mo-
tives or with knowledge of its unconstitutionality.”70 Consequently, the 
claimants were not entitled to damages under section 24(1) in addition 
to a declaration of invalidity under section 52(1).  
The Supreme Court commented on this line of authorities in its June 
2004 decision in Demers.71 The Court held that the regime established 
in Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code72 for dealing with accused persons 
found unfit to stand trial violated the section 7 Charter rights of persons 
who were permanently unfit, since they would continue to be subject to 
the criminal process until they either became fit for trial or the Crown 
failed to establish a prima facie case against them. The law was overly 
broad since it restricted the liberty of accused persons even if there was 
no evidence that their capacity would be recovered or that they posed a 
significant threat to public safety.73 
The Court held that the appropriate remedy was a declaration of in-
validity under section 52(1), suspended for 12 months.74 They found 
that under Schachter, no retroactive remedy is available under section 
24 when legislation is declared unconstitutional and immediately struck. 
Further, when a section 52 declaration of invalidity is temporarily sus-
pended, a section 24 remedy is not available since it would give the 
declaration retroactive effect. If the remedy is reading down or reading 
                                                                                                                                
67 Id. 
68 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Is-
land, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges Reference”]. 
69 Bill 7, Act to Amend the Provincial Court Act, S.N.B. 1995, c. 6. 
70 Supra, note 10, at para. 83. 
71  Supra, note 55. Justices Iacobucci and Bastarache wrote on behalf of eight judges. 
Justice LeBel wrote separate reasons concurring with the majority’s decision on s. 7 of the 
Charter, but reaching a different result on the division of powers issue. 
72  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The provisions that were challenged were ss. 672.33, 672.54 
and 672.81(1) of the Code. 
73  Demers, supra, note 55, at paras. 41-43, 52, 55. 
74  Id., at para. 56. 
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in, a section 24 remedy would duplicate the section 52 relief.75 The 
Court found that Schachter “precludes courts from granting a s. 24(1) 
individual remedy during the period of suspended invalidity.”76 
It observed that while this rule has generally been applied in cases 
involving pecuniary liability, the underlying rationale is that so long as 
the government acts in good faith and without abusing its power, it will 
not be held liable when a law is subsequently found to be unconstitu-
tional. However, the Court added that “[a]lthough the rule in Schachter 
… precludes courts from combining retroactive remedies under s. 24(1) 
with s. 52 remedies, it does not stop courts from awarding prospective 
remedies under s. 24(1) in conjunction with s. 52 remedies.”77 There-
fore, if the challenged provisions were not amended within 12 months, 
permanently unfit accused persons who did not pose a significant threat 
to public safety could apply for a stay of proceedings under section 
24(1) to quash the criminal charges and release them from indefinite 
criminal proceedings.  
To summarize, under Schachter, Guimond and Mackin, a section 
24(1) remedy will rarely be available in conjunction with a remedy 
under section 52(1). The underlying rationale is the common law princi-
ple that governments that act in good faith will not be held liable under a 
statute that is later found to be unconstitutional. A section 24(1) remedy 
will only be available in conjunction with a ruling that a law is invalid 
under section 52(1) if the legislature’s conduct when it passed the law 
amounted to negligence, bad faith or an abuse of power, was clearly 
wrong, or displayed an unreasonable attitude or an ulterior motive. Fail-
ure to anticipate changes in the legal understanding of a constitutional 
right will not suffice, nor will failure to fulfil a promise to refer a pro-
posed law to Committee.78 However, according to Demers, this line of 
authorities does not prevent a court from granting a prospective remedy 
under section 24(1) in conjunction with a section 52 remedy, provided 
that the section 24 remedy takes effect after any suspension of the sec-
tion 52 declaration has expired. 
                                                                                                                                
75  Id., at para. 61. 
76  Id., at para. 62. 
77  Id., at para. 63. 
78  See McAllister, “Mackin: Of Sterile Rules and Real People” (2003), 21 Sup. Ct. L. 
Rev. (2d) 339, for a more complete discussion of these principles. 
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V.  GUIDELINES FOR GRANTING REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 52(1) 
1. Schachter 
Having covered the basic principles for interpreting section 24(1) 
and section 52(1) and the relationship between these provisions, I now 
turn to the guidelines that have been established by the Supreme Court 
for granting remedies, beginning with section 52(1). As noted above, 
these principles were initially set out in Schachter,79 and they were fur-
ther developed in Vriend.80 In Schachter, Lamer C.J. held that the reme-
dies available under section 52(1) include striking down, with or 
without a temporary suspension of the declaration of invalidity, reading 
down or reading in.81 The two guiding principles for determining the 
appropriate remedy are respect for the role of the legislators and respect 
for the purposes of the Charter.82  
Chief Justice Lamer also established a method for choosing a sec-
tion 52 remedy. The first step is to define the extent of the inconsis-
tency. If there is a broadly defined inconsistency, the court may have to 
strike down the entire statute, whereas a narrowly defined inconsistency 
may be remedied by striking down, severing, or reading in. The second 
step is for the court to choose between severance and reading in, taking 
into account the following factors: remedial precision; the need to avoid 
interfering with the legislative objective; whether the changes in the law 
would be so substantial that it would not be safe to assume the legisla-
ture would have passed it; and the significance or longstanding nature of 
the remaining portion. The third step in choosing a remedy is to decide 
whether to temporarily suspend the declaration of invalidity to give the 
legislature an opportunity to address the problem. This is appropriate 
where striking down creates a danger to the public or threatens the rule 
of law, and where striking down an underinclusive law would mean that 
no one would receive benefits.  
When this method was applied in Schachter, Lamer C.J. concluded 
that the underinclusive maternity and parental benefits regime violated 
                                                                                                                                
79 Supra, note 8. 
80 Supra, note 12. 
81 Supra, note 8, at 695. 
82 Id., at 700. See also R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, at para. 114. 
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the claimant’s section 15 right to equal benefit of the law. Striking down 
the regime would deprive everyone of benefits. The legislative objective 
of parental benefits could not be ascertained from the text, nor had it 
been clarified through section 1 evidence. Both factors weighed against 
reading in parental benefits for biological fathers. In addition, reading in 
a much larger group than those already covered would have substan-
tially intruded upon the legislature’s function. Therefore, the majority 
concluded that the appropriate remedy was to declare the legislation 
invalid, and temporarily suspend the declaration.  
2. Vriend 
The central conclusion in Schachter was that reading in constituted 
a legitimate remedy under section 52. In Vriend83 the law on reading in 
was more finely tuned. Although Schachter established that one of the 
twin guiding principles for determining the remedy was respect for the 
role of the legislators, the majority in Vriend held that reading in may be 
appropriate even if the legislature has made a deliberate choice to the 
contrary. The difficulty was that Alberta persistently refused to add 
sexual orientation to the prohibited grounds of discrimination in its 
human rights legislation, which meant that the claimants were challeng-
ing an intentional legislative omission. One of the judges in the Alberta 
Court of Appeal84 held that reading in was never appropriate where a 
legislative omission was a deliberate choice, and that the appropriate 
remedy if the law was invalid was to leave it to the government to rem-
edy the constitutional defect.  
The majority in the Supreme Court did not agree. Justice Iacobucci, 
writing for the majority with respect to the appropriate remedy,85 read 
sexual orientation into the Act effective immediately. This remedy 
would enhance the purpose of the Act as a whole, which was to recog-
nize and protect the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of individuals 
by eliminating discriminatory practices.86 Further, there was no risk of 
                                                                                                                                
83 Supra, note 12. 
84 (1996), 181 A.R. 16, 132 D.L.R. (4th) 595 (C.A.).  
85 Justices Cory and Iacobucci released joint reasons for the majority, in which Cory J. 
dealt with standing, the application of the Charter, and the breach of s. 15(1), while Iacobucci 
J. dealt with s. 1, the appropriate remedy, and the disposition. 
86 Supra, note 12, at 569, para. 150. 
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harmful unintended consequences to private parties or public funds, and 
the mechanisms for dealing with discrimination were already in place 
and did not require significant adjustment.  
Justice Iacobucci acknowledged that whenever a statute is found 
unconstitutional, there will be some interference with legislative intent, 
whether the court reads provisions into the law or strikes it down.87 The 
closest a court can come to respecting legislative intent is to determine 
what the legislature would likely have done if it had known that its 
measures were unconstitutional. The legislature’s choice of means will 
be treated as a bar to reading in only where the means are so central to 
the legislative objective, and so integral to the statutory scheme, that the 
legislature would not have enacted the law without them.88 The exclu-
sion of sexual orientation was not so central to the aims of the legisla-
ture, or so integral to the statutory scheme, that it would rather have 
sacrificed the Act than include sexual orientation.  
Indeed, the Alberta government responded to a recommendation to 
add sexual orientation to the Act by stating that this issue would be dealt 
with by the courts, which Iacobucci J. took as an invitation for the 
courts to read sexual orientation into the Act if its exclusion violated the 
Charter. He also noted that “a democracy requires that legislators take 
into account the interests of majorities and minorities alike… Where the 
interests of a minority have been denied consideration, especially where 
that group has historically been the target of prejudice and discrimina-
tion … judicial intervention is warranted to correct a democratic process 
that has acted improperly.”89 Further, even when a court reads provi-
sions into an unconstitutional law, the legislature has options. It can pass 
a new law which it believes will withstand Charter challenge, or it may 
engage “the ultimate ‘parliamentary safeguard’ ”90 by exercising the 
legislative override in section 33 of the Charter. 
                                                                                                                                
87 Id., at 574, para. 166. 
88 Id., at 574-75, para. 167. 
89 Id., at 577, para. 176. Note that, as discussed above, the majority in Vriend specifi-
cally adopted the Hogg and Bushell dialogue theory of Charter development. 
90 Id., at 578, para. 178. 
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3. Summary  
In summary, Schachter established that the remedies available under 
section 52(1) include striking down — with or without a temporary 
suspension — reading down or reading in. The guiding principles are 
respect for the role of the legislature and for the purposes of the Charter. 
The three steps in identifying the section 52 remedy are: (1) define the 
extent of the inconsistency; (2) choose between severance and reading 
in, taking into account remedial precision, non-interference with the 
legislative objective, how substantially the legislation would change, 
and the significance of the remaining portion; and (3) decide whether to 
temporarily suspend the declaration of invalidity, depending on whether 
striking down would create a public danger, threaten the rule of law, or 
deprive everyone of underinclusive benefits. Vriend added that a court 
may correct an unconstitutional legislative omission by reading in an 
excluded group, even if the legislature explicitly refused to do so.  
VI.  JURISDICTION TO GRANT REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 52(1) 
1. Statutory Criminal Courts 
The issue of jurisdiction to grant remedies under section 52(1) has 
most often arisen when the decision maker was a provincial criminal 
court or an administrative tribunal, since they have no inherent jurisdic-
tion and their authority depends entirely upon statute. The starting point 
is Big M and Mills, both of which involved provincial criminal courts. In 
Big M,91 a company was charged with selling goods in violation of Sun-
day closing legislation. The Supreme Court held that while a Provincial 
Court judge presiding at trial could not grant a declaration of invalidity 
under section 24(1), it could rely on the principle of constitutional su-
premacy in section 52(1) to dismiss charges since no one can be con-
victed under an invalid law. Indeed, provincial courts already had 
authority to determine whether the law under which a charge was laid 
was ultra vires.92 Justice Dickson added that “[i]f a court or tribunal 
finds any statute to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the overriding 
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92 Id., at 313-14. This principle is set out in R. v. Westendorp, supra, note 49. 
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effect of … s. 52(1), is to give the Court not only the power, but the 
duty, to regard the inconsistent statute, to the extent of the inconsis-
tency, as being no longer ‘of force or effect’.”93 
In Mills,94 the question was whether a Provincial Court judge pre-
siding at a preliminary inquiry could order a stay of proceedings to 
remedy a breach of the accused’s section 11(b) Charter right to be tried 
within a reasonable time. The Charter breach resulted from the actions 
of government officials, and section 52 did not apply since there was no 
challenge to legislation. All members of the Court agreed that a prelimi-
nary inquiry is not a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning 
of section 24(1), since that judge’s sole function is to decide whether 
there is enough evidence to commit the accused for trial.95 The judge 
has no authority to acquit, convict, impose a penalty, grant a remedy, or 
determine whether an accused’s Charter rights have been infringed.96 
Therefore, the issue of delay had to be heard by the trial judge.97  
2. Introduction to Administrative Tribunals 
The more difficult issue is the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals 
to determine Charter challenges. Both courts and administrative tribunals 
are bound by the Constitution, and must conduct their proceedings in 
                                                                                                                                
93 Big M, id. at 353; see also R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, at 
307, per La Forest J. to the effect that someone who believes a law is unconstitutional need 
not bring an action to challenge the law, but can simply wait to be charged under the statute 
and raise the Charter violation in defence.  
94 Supra, note 7. 
95 Id., per Lamer J., at 889 and La Forest J., at 970. 
96 Id., per McIntyre J., at 954. This decision was affirmed in R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 588, [1987] S.C.J. No. 23 [hereinafter “Rahey”], and R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1120, [1989] S.C.J. No. 119 [hereinafter “Smith”], both of which involved complaints of 
delay. See also R. v. Seaboyer (sub nom. R. v. Gayme), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, [1991] S.C.J. 
No. 62 [hereinafter “Seaboyer”], in which the majority held that preliminary inquiry judges 
do not have jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of legislation. 
97 This aspect of the decision is explored below under jurisdiction to grant s. 24(1) 
remedies. Despite this apparently limited constitutional authority, the Court emphasized in its 
1997 decision in the Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 68, at 85-87, paras. 127-29, 
that provincial criminal courts play a critical role in enforcing the provisions and protecting 
the values of the Constitution. They enforce s. 52, exercise remedial powers under s. 24, 
police the division of powers, and make decisions on the rights of aboriginal peoples under 
s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This increased role flows in part from a legislative 
policy of granting greater jurisdiction to provincial courts. 
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accordance with the requirements of the Charter. However, the Supreme 
Court held in one of its earliest Charter decisions — Dolphin Delivery 
(1986)98 — that a court order is not a form of government action which 
is subject to Charter scrutiny. The Court held three years later in Slaight 
Communications Inc. v. Davidson (1989)99 that an administrative tribu-
nal’s orders are not subject to the same treatment as court orders. The 
majority100 held that the Charter applied to the order of an adjudicator 
because he was appointed under federal legislation, and all of his pow-
ers were derived from statute. Legislation that confers an imprecise 
discretion must not be interpreted so as to allow Charter rights to be 
infringed. Consequently, administrative bodies that have statutory au-
thority to exercise such discretion exceed their jurisdiction if they make 
orders that infringe Charter rights.101  
The more complex question was whether administrative tribunals 
could determine Charter challenges to their enabling legislation. The 
answer required a careful balancing of the practical advantages and 
disadvantages of decision makers other than courts determining Charter 
issues. Before the Charter was enacted, tribunals had authority to con-
strue their enabling legislation, and to determine other questions of law 
that were necessary to dispose of all matters in issue in cases properly 
before them.102 This included authority to decide whether a matter was 
within federal or provincial legislative competence, and therefore within 
the tribunal’s constitutional mandate.103 Charter challenges to enabling 
legislation could be considered a natural extension of this function. 
                                                                                                                                
98 See Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U., Local 580, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, [1986] 
S.C.J. No. 75.  
99 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45 [hereinafter “Slaight”].  
100 Justice Lamer wrote for the majority with respect to the positive order requiring the 
employer to write a letter of recommendation containing specific facts. He held this order 
infringed the employer’s rights under s. 2(b), but was justified under s. 1. Chief Justice 
Dickson wrote the majority reasons on the negative order prohibiting the employer from 
responding to inquiries other than with the letter, which he found also infringed s. 2(b) but 
was saved by s. 1. 
101 Supra, note 99, at 1077-78. Although the adjudicator’s order in Slaight limited the 
employer’s freedom of expression, the limitation constituted a reasonable limit under s. 1. See 
Slaight, id., at 1080-81. 
102 See, for example, Taylor & Son Ltd. v. Barnett, [1953] 1 All E.R. 843 (C.A.), and 
McLeod v. Egan, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 517.  
103 See, for example, Windsor Airline Limousine Service Ltd. v. Ontario Taxi Assn., Lo-
cal 1688, (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 732 (Div. Ct.).  
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Some bodies, like labour tribunals, had considerable expertise with 
adjudicative functions, and were well-placed to compile the factual 
record and analyze competing policy concerns. Further, people who 
were required to appear before tribunals would have their constitutional 
rights respected without the expense and delay of separate court pro-
ceedings, and administrative decision makers would be forced to con-
sider Charter values. 
The disadvantages of having administrative tribunals decide in con-
stitutional questions included the fact that these bodies had features of 
both the executive and judicial branches of government,104 as well as 
varying levels of legal expertise and functions that ranged from purely 
administrative to quasi-judicial in nature. There were procedural prob-
lems that could have resulted in inadequate evidence, and there were no 
formal mechanisms for involving the Attorneys General. Most impor-
tantly, administrative tribunals were conceived as specialist bodies to 
relieve over-burdened courts and provide accessible, inexpensive, and 
swift justice.105 Requiring them to decide Charter challenges could po-
tentially “go against the raison d’être of administrative tribunals — 
specialization, simple rules of evidence and procedure, speedy deci-
sions.”106  
3. The 1990-1991 Trilogy 
Ultimately, the question was whether justice would be better served 
if tribunals made the initial determination of constitutional challenges.107 
                                                                                                                                
104 Indeed, the American approach was to entirely exclude administrative bodies from 
this type of decision-making. However, our system of government is not based on a rigid 
separation of powers like the United States Constitution, and nothing in the Canadian Consti-
tution apart from ss. 96 to 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 precludes legislators from confer-
ring judicial decision-making authority on bodies other than courts. See Douglas/Kwantlen 
Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, [1990] S.C.J. No. 124, at 599-605 
[S.C.R.] [hereinafter “Douglas College”], and Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Rela-
tions Board), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, [1991] S.C.J. No. 42, at 15 [S.C.R.] [hereinafter “Cuddy 
Chicks”].  
105 See McAllister, “Administrative Tribunals and the Charter: A Tale of Form Con-
quering Substance” [1992] L.S.U.C. Special Lectures 131, at 131-32, for a more complete 
discussion of these issues.  
106 Douglas College, supra, note 104, at 602.  
107 Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 104, at 18. 
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This question was explored in a series of Supreme Court decisions be-
ginning in 1990 with Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas Col-
lege,108 followed six months later in the 1991 companion cases of Cuddy 
Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board)109 and Tétreault-
Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission).110 In 
both Douglas College and Cuddy Chicks, the legislation explicitly con-
ferred jurisdiction on the tribunals to decide questions of law, whereas 
in Tétreault-Gadoury there was no such explicit authority. Justice La 
Forest wrote the majority reasons in these cases. 
In Douglas College the question was whether an arbitrator could 
decide if a mandatory retirement clause in a collective agreement vio-
lated section 15 of the Charter. The arbitrator had authority to interpret 
and apply the provisions of the collective agreement, and the labour 
legislation gave him power to interpret and apply laws intended to regu-
late the employment relationship. Justice La Forest held that a tribunal 
performing its statutory function is “entitled not only to construe the 
relevant legislation but to determine whether that legislation was validly 
enacted.”111 He reasoned that a tribunal must respect the principle of 
constitutional supremacy set out in section 52(1); if it finds that a law it 
is supposed to apply is invalid, “it is bound to treat it as having no force 
or effect.”112 However, if the claimant seeks a remedy under section 
24(1), the Mills rule applies, and the tribunal must have statutory author-
ity over the subject matter and the parties, as well as authority to grant 
the remedy sought.113 Justice La Forest concluded that the arbitrator had 
jurisdiction over the parties, authority to deal with the Charter challenge 
since the statute conferred power to interpret and apply laws intended to 
regulate employment relationships which included the Charter,114 and 
power to grant a remedy like reinstatement if the mandatory retirement 
clause was unconstitutional.115 
                                                                                                                                
108 Douglas College, supra, note 104.   
109 Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 104.   
110 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22, [1991] S.C.J. No. 41 [hereinafter “Tétreault-Gadoury”].  
111 Douglas College, supra, note 104, at 594. 
112 Id. 
113 Id., at 594-95. 
114 Id., at 596. 
115 Id., at 598. 
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Six months later in Cuddy Chicks a union applied to the Labour Re-
lations Board for certification of agricultural workers. Since this group 
was excluded from the legislative regime, the union also challenged the 
exclusion as a Charter violation. The majority held that a tribunal must 
have jurisdiction that is expressly or impliedly conferred by statute over 
the parties, the subject matter, and the remedy sought in order to enter-
tain constitutional challenges. The subject matter was a Charter chal-
lenge to a provision of the Board’s enabling legislation, and the remedy 
of certification could be granted only if the statutory exclusion was held 
to be unconstitutional. Authority to apply the Charter had to be found in 
the Board’s enabling legislation.  
Justice La Forest adopted the proposition in Douglas College that 
“… an administrative tribunal which has been conferred the power to 
interpret law holds a concomitant power to determine whether that law 
is constitutionally valid.”116 He added that “the relevant inquiry is … 
whether the legislature intended to confer on the tribunal the power to 
interpret and apply the Charter.”117 Since the Board had express statu-
tory jurisdiction to determine all questions of fact or law in any matter 
before it, and any legal questions relating to its jurisdiction, it also had 
authority to determine the constitutional validity of the challenged pro-
vision, and to grant a remedy which required it to treat the provision as 
having no force or effect.118 However, in both Douglas College and 
Cuddy Chicks, La Forest J. cautioned that no curial deference will be 
extended to decisions made by administrative tribunals regarding consti-
tutional challenges. In Cuddy Chicks he added that a tribunal cannot 
issue a formal declaration of invalidity; its ruling on a Charter issue is 
not binding and only applies to the matter in which it is raised.119 
The companion case decided at the same time as Cuddy Chicks was 
Tétreault-Gadoury,120 which differed in that the legislation established 
three administrative bodies, and did not explicitly confer authority to 
decide questions of law on two of these tribunals. The Canada Employ-
ment and Immigration Commission denied the claimant’s application 
for unemployment insurance benefits since the legislation disqualified 
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117 Id., at 14-15. 
118 Id., at 18-19. 
119 Id., at 15. 
120 Supra, note 110. 
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persons over the age of 65.121 The claimant appealed to a Board of Refe-
rees, arguing that the statutory disqualification violated her section 15 
equality rights. When the Board upheld the Commission’s decision and 
declined to rule on the Charter issue, the claimant bypassed the second 
level administrative appeal to an Umpire, and went directly to judicial 
review in the Federal Court of Appeal.  
As in the previous cases, section 24(1) was not engaged since the 
claimant challenged the constitutional validity of the tribunal’s enabling 
legislation and sought relief under section 52(1). Justice La Forest reit-
erated that jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues must be found in 
the tribunal’s constituent statute. While its express mandate is normally 
the most important factor, other factors must be considered if the legis-
lature has not spoken on the Board’s authority to decide legal issues.122 
There were two factors which indicated that Parliament intended the 
Umpire, and not the Board, to have jurisdiction to decide Charter chal-
lenges. First, the Umpire had jurisdiction to decide any question of law 
or fact necessary for the disposition of an appeal.123 Second, the Regula-
tions124 contemplated an Umpire finding a provision of the Act unconsti-
tutional. Failure to confer similar powers on the Board was unlikely to 
have been a legislative oversight.125 
Justice La Forest also examined the statutory scheme and compared 
the three administrative bodies. The Commission, at one end of the 
spectrum, was responsible for making all initial decisions on entitle-
ment. Given the volume of claims, it could not have discharged its func-
tion if it also had to determine Charter issues. Umpires, at the opposite 
end, were Federal Court judges with the specialized legal training and 
experience necessary to adjudicate constitutional challenges. Umpires 
had an adjudicative function, and were in a better position to hear and 
resolve constitutional issues without creating delay in the administrative 
system than the Commission, whose primary function was fact finding.126 
                                                                                                                                
121 Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 96 [now Employment 
Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23]. 
122 Supra, note 110, at 34. 
123 This authority was found in s. 96 of the Act [now s. 112]. 
124 Unemployment Insurance Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1576, s. 70(4) [now Employment 
Insurance Regulations, SOR/96-332]. 
125 Supra, note 110, at 33. 
126 Id., at 36-37. 
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Boards of Referees fell somewhere in between. Even though they were 
capable of dealing with Charter issues, this could not outweigh Parlia-
ment’s intent to confer this authority on the Umpire. The practical ad-
vantages of having a tribunal make an initial ruling on Charter issues 
were preserved because the Umpire was a relatively accessible adminis-
trative body outside the court system.127 
4. The Cooper Decision (1996) 
The Tétreault-Gadoury approach was refined in Cooper v. Canada 
(Human Rights Commission).128 The question was whether the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission, or a tribunal appointed by the Commission 
to investigate a complaint, had authority to determine constitutional 
challenges to its constituent legislation — the Canadian Human Rights 
Act (the CHRA).129 The Commission had authority to administer the 
CHRA, and to deal with complaints of discriminatory practices. When it 
received a complaint, the Commission would appoint an investigator to 
look into the matter and report findings. It could then appoint a tribunal 
to inquire into the complaint and grant a remedy.130 Decisions of the 
Commission and the tribunal were subject to judicial review. 
The complainants in Cooper were airline pilots who challenged the 
mandatory retirement clause in their collective agreement on the basis of 
age discrimination. However, the CHRA provided that termination of 
employment at the normal retirement age for similar positions did not 
constitute a discriminatory practice. The investigator recommended 
dismissal of the complaints, and the Commission decided that an inquiry 
was not warranted.131 Since the CHRA did not expressly confer a gen-
eral power to decide questions of law on either the Commission or a 
                                                                                                                                
127 Id., at 35-36. 
128 Supra, note 2. 
129 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. 
130 Supra, note 2, at para. 49. 
131 Id., at para. 44. Justice La Forest rejected the argument that the Commission had a 
limited power to consider the constitutional validity of its enabling legislation as a screening 
function. He held that “[t]here is no middle ground;” either the challenged provision was 
valid or it was not. 
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tribunal appointed by the Commission, the question became whether 
Parliament implicitly granted this jurisdiction.132  
Justice La Forest held that it was appropriate to take practical mat-
ters into account in making this determination. For example, the tribu-
nal’s composition and structure, its expertise, and its procedure and 
appeal routes provide an insight into the mandate which the legislature 
conferred on the administrative tribunal. Further, “there may be prag-
matic and functional policy concerns that argue for or against the tribu-
nal having constitutional competence, though such concerns can never 
supplant the intention of the legislature.”133 Justice La Forest concluded 
that nothing in the scheme of the Act implied that either the Commis-
sion or the tribunal had the authority to entertain constitutional chal-
lenges to the CHRA.  
The Commission was not an adjudicative body; it fulfilled a screen-
ing function analogous to that of a judge at a preliminary inquiry. It 
received complaints, assessed the sufficiency of the evidence, and de-
termined whether an inquiry by a tribunal was warranted, but not 
whether the complaint was made out.134 The Commission’s explicit 
authority to interpret and apply its enabling statute did not imply that it 
had jurisdiction to decide constitutional challenges, since every adminis-
trative body has this power. Further, its authority to determine whether 
it had jurisdiction over a complaint was conceptually different from 
reviewing jurisdictional provisions for compliance with the Charter. As 
La Forest J. put it, “[t]he former represents an application of Parlia-
ment’s intent as reflected in the Act while the latter involves ignoring 
that intent.”135  
He concluded that Parliament did not intend that the Commission 
would have power to consider questions of law. Further, there were 
limited practical advantages to having it address challenges to the 
CHRA. The Commission was not an adjudicative body with special 
expertise in questions of law or procedural mechanisms like rules of 
evidence. Its function of dealing with human rights complaints would 
                                                                                                                                
132 As in the previous decisions, there was no need to determine whether the Commis-
sion or tribunal constituted a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 24(1) of 
the Charter. 
133 Supra, note 2, at para. 47. 
134 Id., at para. 53. 
135 Id., at para. 57. 
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have been disrupted if it had to address complex constitutional issues.136 
In any event, its decision on a Charter issue would probably be reviewed 
in the Federal Court, and it would have been more efficient to com-
mence court proceedings where the issue could be fully canvassed and 
resolved. 
A tribunal appointed by the Commission had authority to inquire 
into a complaint and determine if it was substantiated, which was pri-
marily a fact-finding inquiry. It was implicit in the scheme of the Act 
that the tribunal had a general power to deal with questions of law, in-
cluding interpretation of the CHRA and other statutes, division of pow-
ers questions, the validity of a ground of discrimination under the 
CHRA, and possibly Charter arguments on the constitutional validity of 
the remedies available in a particular case.137 However, as a practical 
matter the tribunal did not have special legal expertise or formal eviden-
tiary rules, its decisions were subject to judicial review, and the time 
required to dispose of constitutional issues would defeat its primary 
purpose of efficient and timely adjudication of human rights com-
plaints.138 Justice La Forest concluded that “… while a tribunal may 
have jurisdiction to consider general legal and constitutional questions, 
logic demands that it has no ability to question the constitutional valid-
ity of a limiting provision of the Act.”139 
5. The Rules Restated in Martin 
The decision in Cooper appeared to substantially narrow the range 
of tribunals that may have had implied jurisdiction to determine Charter 
challenges to their enabling legislation under the 1990-1991 trilogy. The 
practical considerations taken into account in Cooper, particularly 
whether the tribunal had an adjudicative function or specialized legal 
expertise, would have undermined the authority of most administrative 
decision makers to hear Charter challenges. Further, the distinction 
drawn between general legal questions and constitutional issues was 
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inconsistent with the decisions in Douglas College, Cuddy Chicks, and 
Tétreault-Gadoury.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court restated the law in Nova Scotia 
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin,140 released in October 2003. 
The claimants challenged provisions that excluded chronic pain syn-
drome from the provincial general workers’ compensation system, and 
replaced it with a four-week work conditioning program after which no 
benefits were available.141 The Workers’ Compensation Board (“the 
Board”) made the initial decisions denying entitlement, and the Work-
ers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal (“the Appeal Tribunal”) heard the 
appeals. The claimants argued before the Appeal Tribunal that the legis-
lation infringed their equality rights. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed that 
it had jurisdiction to apply the Charter, and held that the challenged 
provisions were unconstitutional.142  
Justice Gonthier, writing for the unanimous Court, held that these 
provisions violated section 15 of the Charter, and could not be saved 
under section 1. He also reappraised and restated the rules concerning 
the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to apply the Charter, holding 
that “[a]dministrative tribunals which have jurisdiction — whether ex-
plicit or implied — to decide questions of law arising under a legislative 
provision are presumed to have concomitant jurisdiction to decide the 
constitutional validity of that provision. This presumption may only be 
rebutted by showing that the legislature clearly intended to exclude 
Charter issues from the tribunal’s authority over questions of law.”143 
He also explicitly stated that the majority reasons in Cooper could no 
longer be relied upon to the extent that they were inconsistent with the 
approach in Martin.144  
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141 The legislation was the Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10, as 
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The legislation at issue in Martin expressly conferred authority on 
the Appeal Tribunal to decide questions of law, and this explicit juris-
diction was presumed to include authority to consider the constitutional 
validity of its constituent legislation. The presumption was not rebutted; 
there was no clear implication in the Act that the legislature intended to 
exclude Charter issues from the Appeal Tribunal’s authority to decide 
questions of law.145 
Justice Gonthier restated the policy reasons set out in the 1990-1991 
trilogy for permitting administrative tribunals to determine constitu-
tional challenges to their enabling statutes. The most important is that 
the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, and inconsistent laws are 
invalid. The invalidity arises by operation of section 52(1), not from a 
declaration of a court. In principle, a provision that is inconsistent with 
the Constitution is invalid from the moment it is enacted. Thus, “by 
virtue of s. 52(1), the question of constitutional validity inheres in every 
legislative enactment. Courts may not apply invalid laws, and the same 
obligation applies to every level and branch of government, including 
the administrative organs of the state.”146  
The second reason that tribunals should hear Charter challenges is 
that they have expertise in their field, including a thorough understand-
ing of the legislative scheme, the practical constraints and the conse-
quences of a remedy, which makes their record and findings valuable to 
a reviewing court.147 Third, allowing administrative tribunals to decide 
Charter issues does not undermine the role of the courts as final arbiters 
of constitutional validity since these decisions are subject to judicial 
review on a correctness standard.148 Fourth, tribunals have limited au-
thority to grant constitutional remedies; they cannot make general decla-
rations of invalidity and their findings that provisions are invalid do not 
bind future decision makers. A binding precedent that legislation is 
invalid can only be obtained through a declaration from a court.149 
                                                                                                                                
Commission had no express or implied authority to decide questions of law arising under the 
challenged provision. 
145 Id., at para. 4. 
146 Id., at para. 28. 
147 Id., at para. 30, citing Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 104, at 16-17, to the effect that a 
tribunal can analyze competing policy concerns and compile a cogent record. 
148 Martin, id., at para. 31, citing Cuddy Chicks, id., at 17. 
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Since tribunals are creatures of statute, their jurisdiction to entertain 
Charter issues must be found in their enabling legislation, and it must 
extend to the subject matter, the parties, and the remedy sought.150 The 
central question is whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on the 
constitutional validity of the challenged provision.151 To answer this 
question the court applies the presumption, based on the principle of 
constitutional supremacy, that all legal decisions must take into account 
the supreme law of the land. Generally, an administrative tribunal that 
has the power to interpret a law has concomitant power to determine 
whether that law is constitutionally valid.152 The corollary is that people 
are entitled to assert their constitutional rights in the most accessible 
forum, without commencing parallel court proceedings.153 Many tribu-
nals have exclusive initial jurisdiction over a matter, and forcing Charter 
issues into the courts would divide the proceedings, and make them 
longer and more expensive.154 
The issue is not whether the legislature intended that the tribunal 
apply the Charter, and suggestions to that effect in previous cases such 
as Cooper must be ignored. The legislative intent approach is artificial 
since many statutes were enacted before the Charter came into force, 
and it is not compatible with the principle that the question of constitu-
tional validity inheres in every law by virtue of section 52(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867.155  
The correct question is “whether the empowering legislation implic-
itly or explicitly grants to the tribunal the jurisdiction to interpret or 
decide any question of law. If it does, then the tribunal will be presumed 
to have the concomitant jurisdiction to interpret or decide that question 
in light of the Charter, unless the legislator has removed that power 
from the tribunal… In other words, the power to decide a question of 
                                                                                                                                
150 Id., at para. 33, citing Douglas College, supra, note 104, at 595; Cuddy Chicks, su-
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law is the power to decide by applying only valid laws.”156 There need 
not be a broad grant of jurisdiction to decide all questions of law that 
arise before a tribunal. It is sufficient if the legislature confers power “to 
decide questions of law arising under the challenged provision, and that 
the constitutional question relate[s] to that provision.”157 As Gonthier J. 
put it, the “Charter is not invoked as a separate subject matter; rather, it 
is a controlling norm in decisions over matters within the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.”158  
If there is no explicit grant, the court must decide “whether the leg-
islator intended to confer upon the tribunal implied jurisdiction to decide 
questions of law arising under the challenged provision.”159 The court 
must look at the statute as a whole and consider relevant factors which 
include: the tribunal’s statutory mandate, and whether the ability to 
decide questions of law is necessary to fulfill this mandate; the interac-
tion of the tribunal with other parts of the administrative system; 
whether the tribunal is adjudicative in nature; and practical considera-
tions that include the tribunal’s capacity to consider questions of law.  
However, practical considerations cannot override a clear implica-
tion in the statute, particularly where lack of authority to decide ques-
tions of law would undermine the tribunal’s capacity to fulfill its 
mandate. If the tribunal has implied jurisdiction to decide questions of 
law arising under a legislative provision, it also has jurisdiction to de-
termine the constitutional validity of that provision.160 Further, there is 
no distinction between “general” and “limited” questions of law; an 
administrative tribunal either will or will not have power to decide legal 
                                                                                                                                
156 Id., at para. 36 (emphasis in original). See also para. 48 where the test is summa-
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157 Id., at paras. 37, 40. 
158 Id., at para. 39. Justice Gonthier noted that in Douglas College, supra, note 104, the 
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issues.161 If a tribunal does have this power, it can go beyond the ena-
bling statute and decide issues of common law or statutory interpretation 
and Charter challenges that arise in cases properly before it.162 A tribu-
nal need not be adjudicative in nature to find implicit jurisdiction.163 
Once the presumption has been raised that a tribunal has jurisdiction 
to decide Charter issues, the burden is on the party challenging the tri-
bunal’s jurisdiction to establish that the presumption has been rebutted. 
The presumption “may only be rebutted by an explicit withdrawal of 
authority to decide constitutional questions or by a clear implication to 
the same effect, arising from the statute itself rather than from external 
considerations. The question … is whether an examination of the statu-
tory provisions clearly leads to the conclusion that the legislature in-
tended to exclude the Charter, or … a category of questions of law 
encompassing the Charter, from the scope of the questions of law to be 
addressed by the tribunal.”164  
For example, if a statute expressly confers jurisdiction on another 
administrative body to consider Charter issues or complex legal ques-
tions that are difficult or time-consuming, and it provides a procedure 
that allows these issues to be efficiently directed to that body, this could 
clearly imply that the legislature did not intend for the tribunal to decide 
constitutional questions. Further, a tribunal’s practical capacity may be 
relevant in determining the scope of its implicit authority to decide legal 
questions, but these concerns alone generally will not be enough to rebut 
the presumption.165 Justice Gonthier declined to express an opinion on 
the constitutional validity of a provision that creates procedural barriers 
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for claimants asserting their rights in a timely and effective manner; for 
example, by removing Charter jurisdiction of a tribunal without provid-
ing an effective alternative forum.166  
When he applied this test in Martin, Gonthier J. concluded that the 
Appeal Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide Charter issues since it had 
explicit statutory authority to determine questions of law. The Act pro-
vided that the Appeal Tribunal could “confirm, vary or reverse the deci-
sion of a hearing officer,”167 exercising the authority conferred on the 
Board to “determine all questions of fact and law.” Other provisions 
confirmed that the legislature intended to give the Tribunal authority to 
decide legal issues. These included a right of appeal to the Court of 
Appeal “on any question of law,”168 which suggested that the Appeal 
Tribunal could make an initial determination on these questions. The 
presumption of authority was not rebutted since there was no clear im-
plication in the Act that the legislature intended to exclude the Charter 
from the Appeal Tribunal’s authority.  
Even if there had been no express grant of authority, Gonthier J. 
found the Appeal Tribunal had implied power to decide questions of 
law. First, this authority was necessary for the Tribunal to effectively 
fulfill its mandate. Inability to decide such questions would have seri-
ously impeded its work and threatened access to a forum that could 
decide all aspects of an injured worker’s case. This implied jurisdiction 
extended to other questions of statutory interpretation and common 
law.169  
Second, the Appeal Tribunal was adjudicative in nature and fully 
capable of deciding Charter issues. It was under the supervision of the 
Minister of Justice, and independent of the Board, which was supervised 
by the Minister of Labour. The Appeal Tribunal established its own 
rules of procedure, and could consider all relevant evidence and extend 
time limits. Its members had the powers, privileges, and immunities of a 
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commissioner appointed under the Public Inquiries Act,170 and all appeal 
commissioners were lawyers.171 However, Gonthier J. emphasized that a 
legislature can express its intention in a statutory scheme to give a non-
adjudicative body authority to decide questions of law;172 “the adjudica-
tive or non-adjudicative character of a tribunal is not dispositive.”173  
Third, the Attorney General could intervene in any proceedings rais-
ing constitutional questions,174 which relieved private parties and admin-
istrative agencies of the burden of defending legislation.175 Fourth, the 
backlog of cases at the Appeal Tribunal was a practical consideration 
that had little weight in the face of the clear legislative intent to confer 
power to decide questions of law. There was no suggestion that multiple 
Charter challenges caused or contributed to the backlog. Further, per-
mitting the Appeal Tribunal to apply the Charter gave courts the benefit 
of a full record established by a specialized tribunal, and permitted 
workers to have their Charter rights recognized relatively quickly in an 
accessible and inexpensive forum.176 
The Court concluded that the presumption that the Appeals Tribunal 
had jurisdiction to apply the Charter was not rebutted by anything in the 
Act. Provisions that permitted the Board of Directors to review appeals 
raising issues of law and general policy did not undermine the tribunal’s 
authority to decide Charter challenges. The Directors’ power to suspend 
an appeal for one year to permit them to adopt a policy response to 
issues was not sufficient to clearly rebut the presumption.177 
The provision of the Act that conferred explicit jurisdiction on the 
Appeal Tribunal to decide questions of law178 also applied to the Work-
ers’ Compensation Board, which suggested that it had the same jurisdic-
tion without respect to Charter challenges. The Board submitted that it 
did not have the resources or expertise to deal with numerous Charter 
cases, and that this would compromise its efficiency and timeliness in 
                                                                                                                                
170 R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 372. 
171 Supra, note 2, at para. 53. 
172 Id., at para. 54. 
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174 This authority was under the Constitutional Questions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 89. 
175 Supra, note 2, at para. 55, citing Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 104, at 17-18. 
176 Martin, id., at para. 56. 
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handling a large volume of compensation cases. However, these practi-
cal considerations could not override the clear expression of legislative 
intent in the statute. The Act also permitted the Board to refer complex 
issues to the Appeal Tribunal or to the courts as a matter of administra-
tive convenience. Justice Gonthier held that since this approach pre-
served an administrative process which avoided parallel proceedings in 
the courts, the Board would not infringe its duty to consider the consti-
tutional validity of the Act by referring cases to the Appeal Tribunal.179  
6. Martin Applied in the Paul Decision 
The test in Martin was applied in the companion case of Paul v. 
British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission).180 The issue was 
whether the provincial Forest Appeals Commission (“the Commission”) 
had jurisdiction to determine aboriginal rights issues that were raised in 
defence to charges of cutting Crown timber in violation of the British 
Columbia Forest Practices Code (“the Code”).181 Mr. Paul was a regis-
tered Indian who argued that he had an aboriginal right to cut timber to 
use for renovating his home. The District Manager and the Administra-
tive Review Panel found against him. He then appealed to the Commis-
sion, which held that it had jurisdiction to decide the aboriginal rights 
issue. Paul challenged this decision, partly on the basis that a provincial 
tribunal would be encroaching upon a matter within exclusive federal 
competence.  
Justice Bastarache, for the unanimous Court, held that British Co-
lumbia had legislative authority to confer jurisdiction on an administra-
tive tribunal to consider questions of aboriginal rights in carrying out its 
provincial mandate. The Code was a valid provincial law in relation to 
the development, conservation and management of forestry resources. It 
applied to Indians so long as it only had incidental effects upon the 
“core of Indianness” (which is a matter within federal jurisdiction), and 
                                                                                                                                
179 Martin, supra, note 2, at paras. 62-65. There was no need for a conclusion that either 
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it did not contravene section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.182 The 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity did not apply since the Com-
mission’s function was adjudicative and there was no provincial legisla-
tion that indirectly regulated federal matters.183  
The Court rejected arguments that remedial powers are the key to 
determining jurisdiction,184 since Tétreault-Gadoury185 recognized “that 
the power to find a statutory provision of no effect, by virtue of s. 52(1) 
… is distinct from the remedial power to invoke s. 24(1) of the Charter. 
… In other words, an inferior court’s remedial powers are not determi-
native of its jurisdiction to hear and determine constitutional issues.”186 
In any event, section 24(1) was not engaged in this case, since section 
35 is not part of the Charter, and decisions dealing with section 24(1) 
courts do not apply outside that unique context.187 
The Court concluded that administrative tribunals must take into ac-
count all applicable federal and provincial legal rules in applying their 
constituent legislation; otherwise, they would have grave difficulty 
fulfilling their responsibilities.188 A board could not respect the constitu-
tional division of powers if it was unable to take the boundary between 
provincial and federal authority into account.189 Further, both federal 
and provincial governments must respect section 35 aboriginal rights 
unless an infringement of the right can be justified. Therefore, the prov-
inces must be able to confer authority on their administrative tribunals 
to take aboriginal rights into account.190  
                                                                                                                                
182 Supra, note 180, at paras. 11, 14. 
183 Id. See paras. 15 and 19 where the Court held that if the Code provisions indirectly 
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doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity would have required that the Code be read down so it 
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Tourism & Culture), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, [2002] S.C.J. No. 33, at para. 75.  
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185 Supra, note 110, at 31. 
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189 Id. Indeed, many tribunals routinely make decisions regarding matters within the 
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The effect of this ruling was that Indians charged under the Code 
would initially raise their aboriginal rights defences before the Commis-
sion instead of the superior court.191 The Commission would apply con-
stitutional or federal laws in the same way as a provincial court when it 
incidentally determines a question of aboriginal rights.192 This outcome 
was consistent with the principle that individuals should be able to en-
force their constitutionally protected rights as early as possible in the 
administrative process.193  
Justice Bastarache also held that the procedural right to raise a de-
fence of aboriginal rights at first instance does not go to the core of 
Indianness, and therefore does not intrude upon federal jurisdiction.194 
The Commission’s decisions differ from both extinguishment of a right 
and legislation relating to Indians or aboriginal rights.195 First, adjudica-
tors do not create, amend, or extinguish aboriginal rights; they make 
findings on the basis of the evidence about the existence or extinguish-
ment of the right.196 Second, the Commission cannot make a declaration 
as to the validity of a law. Its constitutional decisions are not legally 
binding, they do not become authoritative common law over time, and 
they are subject to review on a correctness standard.197 
The Court found there was no basis upon which to distinguish the 
power to determine section 35 questions from the power to decide any 
other constitutional question. Aboriginal rights are not reserved to supe-
rior courts, they do not constitute a federal enclave, nor are they more 
complex or difficult than other issues. Tribunals have fact finding proc-
esses, and their less stringent evidentiary rules may be more conducive 
to fully airing an aboriginal rights issue.198 Further, Bastarache J. was 
not convinced that there was either a rationale or a process that would 
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appropriately distinguish between simple aboriginal law questions that 
could be resolved by administrative tribunals, and more complex issues 
that should be decided by courts.199 
The Court adopted the approach set out in Martin as the correct 
method for determining whether an administrative tribunal has jurisdic-
tion to decide constitutional questions.200 In particular, “the principle of 
constitutional supremacy … leads to a presumption that all legal deci-
sions will take into account the supreme law of the land [and that] the 
power to decide a question of law is the power to decide by applying 
only valid laws.”201 Justice Bastarache summarized the test as follows: 
The essential question is whether the empowering legislation 
implicitly or explicitly grants to the tribunal the jurisdiction to 
interpret or decide any question of law. If it does, the tribunal will be 
presumed to have the concomitant jurisdiction to interpret or decide 
that question in light of s. 35 or any other relevant constitutional 
provision. Practical considerations will generally not suffice to rebut 
the presumption that arises from authority to decide questions of law. 
This is not to say, however, that practical considerations cannot be 
taken into consideration in determining … the most appropriate way of 
handling a particular dispute where more than one option is 
available.202 
The Code permitted a party to “make submissions as to facts, law 
and jurisdiction,” and to appeal on a question of law. Under the test in 
Martin, this meant that the Commission had the power to decide ques-
tions of law, including aboriginal rights that arose incidentally to for-
estry matters, and nothing in the Code clearly rebutted this 
presumption.203 Therefore, the Commission had jurisdiction to hear and 
decide Paul’s defence of his aboriginal right to harvest logs.204 Alterna-
tively, Paul could apply to the Superior Court for a declaration of his 
aboriginal rights.  
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7. Summary 
Most questions with respect to jurisdiction under section 52(1) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 have arisen in the context of statutory crimi-
nal courts and administrative tribunals, since their authority is drawn 
entirely from statute. The starting point is Big M, in which the Supreme 
Court held that even though a Provincial Court judge presiding at trial 
cannot declare a law invalid, it can dismiss charges if it finds that the 
law under which a charge was laid is unconstitutional.  
Like courts, administrative tribunals are bound by the Constitution, 
and must conduct their proceedings in accordance with the requirements 
of the Charter. Unlike courts, their orders are subject to Charter scru-
tiny; administrative bodies exercising imprecise statutory discretion 
exceed their jurisdiction if they make orders that infringe Charter rights. 
Further, an administrative tribunal may have authority to entertain Char-
ter challenges to its enabling legislation. The Supreme Court initially 
addressed this question in the 1990-1991 trilogy of Douglas College, 
Cuddy Chicks, and Tétreault-Gadoury, in which an arbitrator, a labour 
board, and an Unemployment Insurance Act Umpire were found to have 
jurisdiction to determine Charter challenges.  
These cases established the foundation for the current guidelines, 
particularly the principle that a tribunal need not be a court of competent 
jurisdiction within the meaning of section 24(1) to have authority to 
decide Charter challenges. A tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter, and authority to grant the remedy sought, has 
authority under section 52(1) to determine Charter challenges to its 
constituent legislation. In order to have jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of a Charter challenge, the tribunal must have express or implied 
authority to determine questions of law. However, the tribunal cannot 
grant a declaration of invalidity, and no curial deference will be ex-
tended to its constitutional decisions.  
The issue was reconsidered in 1996 in Cooper, where the majority 
held that neither the Canadian Human Rights Commission nor a Tribu-
nal appointed by the Commission had authority to decide Charter chal-
lenges. The majority held that the central question was whether the 
legislature intended that the tribunal could apply the Charter, which was 
ascertained by focusing on practical considerations like the adjudicative 
nature of the tribunal, and by distinguishing between types of legal 
questions. Cooper appeared to be at odds with the 1990-1991 trilogy, 
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which turned on authority to decide legal issues. Further, the practical 
considerations that were taken into account would have excluded most 
administrative decision makers. 
The guidelines crystallized in the Martin decision in 2003, where 
both the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the Appeal Tribunal 
were found to have explicit jurisdiction to decide Charter issues. Martin 
overruled Cooper to the extent of the inconsistency between the two 
judgments. Administrative tribunals with either explicit or implied ju-
risdiction to interpret or decide any question of law under a legislative 
provision, are now presumed to have the concomitant jurisdiction to 
decide the constitutional validity of that provision. The suggestions in 
Cooper that the issue is whether the legislature intended the tribunal to 
apply the Charter must be ignored.  
If there is no explicit grant of authority to decide legal questions, the 
court must decide whether the legislature intended to confer implied 
jurisdiction by looking to the statute as a whole. Relevant factors in-
clude the tribunal’s statutory mandate, and whether authority to decide 
questions of law is necessary to effectively fulfill this mandate; the 
interaction of the tribunal with other elements of the administrative 
system; whether the tribunal is adjudicative in nature; and practical 
considerations including its capacity to consider legal questions. 
However, practical considerations cannot override a clear implica-
tion in the statute itself, and the adjudicative nature of the tribunal is not 
determinative. If a tribunal has authority to decide questions of law, it 
can go beyond the enabling statute and decide issues of common law, 
statutory interpretation, and Charter challenges. The burden is on the 
party challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction to establish that the pre-
sumption has been rebutted by showing that the legislature clearly in-
tended to exclude Charter issues from the questions of law to be 
addressed.  
The decision in Paul builds upon Martin by making it clear that tri-
bunals with authority to consider legal questions must take into account 
all applicable federal and provincial legal rules in applying their con-
stituent legislation. Thus, the Forest Appeals Commission had authority 
to hear and determine the defence of aboriginal rights. 
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VII.  GUIDELINES FOR GRANTING REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 24(1) 
1. Introduction 
Guidelines for granting remedies under section 24(1) have devel-
oped more slowly than those for section 52(1) remedies. The starting 
point is the Supreme Court’s decision in Mills (1986).205 As noted 
above, the issue was whether a preliminary inquiry court could grant a 
stay of proceedings to remedy the breach of the accused’s right to be 
tried within a reasonable time. Justice McIntyre held that the Charter did 
not create courts of competent jurisdiction; section 24(1) simply vests 
additional powers in courts which are already competent independent of 
the Charter, because they have jurisdiction over the person and the sub-
ject matter, and authority to make the order sought.206  
Justice McIntyre also considered the remedies available under sec-
tion 24(1), which simply provides that the court may issue such remedy 
as it considers “appropriate and just in the circumstances.” He stated 
that it “is difficult to imagine language which could give the court a 
wider and less fettered discretion. It is impossible to reduce this wide 
discretion to some sort of binding formula for general application in all 
cases, and it is not for appellate courts to pre-empt or cut down this wide 
discretion.”207 For example, no court can say that a stay of proceedings 
will always be the appropriate remedy in a particular type of case; “the 
circumstances will be infinitely variable from case to case and the rem-
edy will vary with the circumstances.”208 The section 24(1) remedy will 
also depend on the statutory or inherent jurisdiction of the court or 
tribunal.  
Since remedies are both discretionary and variable, it has taken 
some time to develop guidelines for the interpretation and application of 
section 24(1). The most helpful Supreme Court decision is Doucet-
Boudreau,209 released in November of 2003. The Court also considered 
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this issue in Dunedin,210 which was released two years earlier in  
December 2001. 
2. Dunedin 
The issue in Dunedin was whether a justice of the peace, sitting as a 
trial judge under the Provincial Offences Act, had authority to order 
costs against the Crown for breaching the accused’s Charter right to full 
disclosure of evidence.211 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the 
unanimous Court, began with the Mills criteria that a section 24(1) court 
must have jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, and au-
thority to grant the remedy sought. She added four related propositions 
that inform the interpretation of section 24(1).  
First, the provision must be given a broad and purposive, or large 
and liberal interpretation. Indeed, “the language of this provision ap-
pears to confer the widest possible discretion on a court to craft reme-
dies for violations of Charter rights… [that] should not be frustrated by 
a ‘[n]arrow and technical’ reading …”212 Second, section 24(1) “must be 
interpreted in a manner that provides a full, effective and meaningful 
remedy for Charter violations.”213 Third, section 24(1) and section 24(2) 
must be read harmoniously together, and the phrase “court of competent 
jurisdiction” must be interpreted in a way that produces just and worka-
ble results under both provisions.214 Fourth, these provisions should not 
be read so broadly that they confer authority that courts and tribunals 
were never intended to have.215 As stated in Mills, the jurisdiction of 
courts and tribunals is fixed by the legislatures, not by judges.  
Chief Justice McLachlin added that the “framers of the Charter did 
not intend to erase the constitutional distinctions between different types 
of courts, nor to intrude on legislative powers more than necessary to 
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211 Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33. See also the companion case of 
Hynes, supra, note 15, which applied the test set out in Dunedin. The majority held that a 
judge sitting at a preliminary inquiry did not have jurisdiction under s. 24(2) to exclude 
statements obtained in breach of the accused’s Charter rights. 
212 Supra, note 15, at para. 18, citing Law Society (Upper Canada) v. Skapinker, [1984] 
1 S.C.R. 357, at 366. 
213 Dunedin, id., at para. 19. 
214 Id., at para. 21. 
215 Id., at para. 22. 
46  Supreme Court Law Review (2004), 25 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
achieve the aims of the Charter.”216 A court interpreting section 24 must 
“achieve a broad, purposive interpretation that facilitates direct access to 
appropriate and just Charter remedies … while respecting the structure 
and practice of the existing court system and the exclusive role of Par-
liament and the legislatures in prescribing the jurisdiction of courts and 
tribunals.”217 She then articulated a “functional and structural” approach 
for determining if a statutory court or administrative tribunal has juris-
diction to grant the remedy sought, which is addressed below. 
3. Doucet-Boudreau  
(a) The Facts 
The most helpful case on the application of section 24(1), 
Doucet-Boudreau,218 involved a Nova Scotia Supreme Court Judge who 
ordered the provincial government to use its best efforts to provide sec-
ondary level French language programs and educational facilities by 
specified dates.219 The sole issue before the Supreme Court of Canada 
was whether he had jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the Charter to 
hear periodic reports on the government’s progress toward fulfilling this 
order. The reporting requirement raised the very issues addressed in 
McLachlin C.J.’s Weir Memorial Lecture. In the course of dealing with 
these issues, the Court developed guidelines for granting section 24(1) 
remedies.  
The claimants were Francophone parents220 who had lobbied the 
government throughout the 1990s to enforce their Charter-protected 
French language education rights. In 1996, the government created a 
French school board and announced that new French schools would be 
built. However, construction never began, and the projects were offi-
cially put on hold in 1999 when the province was undergoing financial 
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difficulties, and there was divided public opinion regarding the need for 
French schools and programs. The litigation was commenced in 1998, 
as the last resort of frustrated Francophone parents who were watching 
the assimilation of their children in violation of their section 23 Charter 
rights that had been entrenched, but not enforced, for 16 years.221 
In his decision released in June 2000, LeBlanc J. found that the real 
issue between the parties was the date on which French language pro-
grams and facilities would be implemented.222 The government did not 
challenge entitlement; “[i]t simply delayed fulfilling its obligations 
despite reports that assimilation was reaching critical levels.”223 It failed 
to give sufficient priority to the fact that Charter rights were at stake,224 
and that the purpose of minority language education is to help prevent 
further assimilation and preserve French language and culture.  
The trial judge disposed of the application in a three-part order, and 
did not reserve judgment on any issue.225 First, he made a declaration 
that the claimants’ section 23 rights had been breached, since the prov-
ince did not fulfill its obligation to take positive steps to provide sub-
stantive equality in education for the children of the linguistic minority 
where numbers warranted.226 Second, he held that they were entitled to 
publicly funded secondary level French language programs and educa-
tional facilities without unreasonable delay,227 and issued a mandatory 
injunction ordering the government to use its best efforts to comply by 
specified dates, which ranged from September 2000 to September 2001 
depending on location.228  
The third component of the order was a requirement that the parties 
appear before the trial judge periodically to report on the progress of 
the government’s efforts to comply with his “best efforts” order. This 
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provision was added in response to the claimants’ request that the trial 
judge retain jurisdiction for the period required for compliance, in order 
to avoid becoming functus officio.229 The final order simply stated that 
“[t]he Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear reports from the Respon-
dents respecting the Respondents’ compliance with this Order. The 
Respondents shall report to this Court on … such … date as the Court 
may determine.”230 The trial judge scheduled the first appearance for the 
month after the decision was released and stated “at that time the re-
spondents will report on the status of their efforts.”231 The order did not 
contain any details regarding the form and content of the reports, the 
evidence required or the procedure that would be followed. Since there 
were no fresh proceedings to enforce the order, there were no estab-
lished parameters under the rules of practice.  
Nonetheless, five reporting sessions were held over the nine-month 
period following the decision. Justice LeBlanc required an official from 
the Department of Education to appear at each session, and to file an 
affidavit that described the government’s progress in complying with his 
mandatory order. Cross-examinations were permitted, as were rebuttal 
affidavits. The matters covered included the type of construction of the 
school facilities, whether new facilities would be built or existing build-
ings would be renovated, and details such as the type of ventilation 
system that would be used.232 The order was similar in many ways to the 
structural injunctions issued by American courts, and considered by 
McLachlin C.J. in the Weir Memorial Lecture. The majority in the 
Court of Appeal described the trial judge’s role as that of a referee or 
administrator, while the dissenting judge233 called it “mediation on an 
impressive scale…”234 in which the judge made no orders, but presided 
while the parties worked out compromises. The province objected 
throughout that the trial judge had no jurisdiction since he was functus 
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officio,235 while LeBlanc J. maintained that he had authority to require 
reports pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter.236 
The reporting order achieved what the Court set out to do; it ensured 
prompt compliance to reduce the risk that minority language education 
rights would be forever lost because of additional procedural delays.237 
For example, after a nine-month delay, the province called for tenders 
eight days before the first reporting session, and ensured that a construc-
tion schedule was in place for the hearing.238 By the time the last meet-
ing was held in March of 2001, there had been enough progress that the 
main issue under consideration was whether any more reporting ses-
sions were needed.239 Most deadlines were met, and when the Court of 
Appeal rendered its decision in June 2001, the final school building 
required to fulfill the order was being renovated.  
(b) The Court of Appeal 
The government appealed the reporting requirement, challenging the 
authority of LeBlanc J. to remain seized of the matter after he rendered 
judgment. It argued that under the common law doctrine of functus 
officio, the trial judge had no jurisdiction to retain authority over the 
implementation of his own order, to rehear the matter, or to continue 
hearings. Further, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court could not reopen a 
final decision because the power to rehear was vested in the Court of 
Appeal under the Judicature Act.240 The government also argued that 
if the authority to retain jurisdiction did exist, the courts ought to 
exercise judicial restraint and avoid making orders that require ongoing 
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supervision.241 The main concern appeared to be that the reporting proc-
ess had no form or focus when compared to an application to enforce a 
court order. As for the Charter, the government argued that when trial 
judges grant remedies under section 24(1), they cannot enlarge their 
jurisdiction by holding reporting hearings. The claimants asserted that 
these hearings were within the authority of a superior court to craft a 
remedy under section 24(1).242 
It is some measure of the amount of disagreement over the reporting 
order that it was struck down by the Court of Appeal by a two-one ma-
jority, but was reinstated by a five-four majority in the Supreme Court 
of Canada. The two appellate courts, and the majority and dissenting 
judges within each court, reached diametrically opposed conclusions. A 
total of six appeal judges243 supported the reporting order while six244 
opposed it. The competing approaches are illustrated in the majority and 
dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal. 
Justice Flinn, writing for the majority, held that once trial judges de-
cide the issues between the parties and make orders that dispose of all 
matters under reserve, they do not have jurisdiction to remain seized of 
the case in order to determine whether the government complies with 
their decisions.245 He found that “the Charter does not extend the juris-
diction of these courts from a procedural point of view … Ordering a 
remedy is one thing. Providing for its enforcement is quite another 
…”246 Justice Flinn agreed with McLachlin C.J.’s comments in the Weir 
Memorial Lecture, that American constitutional practices should not be 
                                                                                                                                
241 Doucet-Boudreau CA, id., at para. 71. 
242 The Court of Appeal’s decision was rendered in June 2001, and pre-dated the Dune-
din decision, which was released in December 2001. 
243 One judge in the NSCA, plus five judges in the SCC. 
244 Two judges in the NSCA, plus four judges in the SCC. 
245 Doucet-Boudreau CA, supra, note 221, at paras. 19-22, 29-36. The cases cited in 
support of the order, and rejected by Flinn J.A., were: Reference re Language Rights Under 
S. 23 of Manitoba Act, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721; Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. 
v. Minority Language School Board No. 50 (1983), 51 N.B.R. (2d) 219; Marchand v. Simcoe 
County Board of Education (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 596 (Ont. H.C.); Marchand v. Simcoe 
County Board of Education (No. 2) (1987), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. H.C.); Lavoie v. Nova 
Scotia (Attorney General) (1988), 47 D.L.R. (4th) 586 (N.S.T.D.); and Assoc. des parents 
francophones (Columbie-Britannique) v. British Columbia (1996), 139 D.L.R. (4th) 356 
(B.C.S.C.), and (1999), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 534 (B.C.S.C.). 
246 Doucet-Boudreau CA, id., at para. 39, relying on Mills, supra, note 7. 
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lightly adopted in Canada,247 and that our courts should avoid confronta-
tion with governments through judicial restraint and mutual deference 
and cooperation.248 He concluded that Canadian courts should “assume 
that government will comply with Charter remedies which the courts 
order.”249 The reporting hearings were unnecessary since there was no 
evidence that the government would fail to comply, and the claimants 
could have commenced fresh proceedings to enforce the order.250  
Justice Freeman, in dissent, wrote that the reporting order was “an 
exemplary remedy”251 and “a pragmatic approach to getting the job done 
expeditiously,”252 virtually on time, and with minimum inconvenience 
and unnecessary cost. It contained a “creative blending”253 of a declara-
tion of Charter rights, a mandatory injunction, and a mediation mecha-
nism that gave life to section 23 Charter rights.254 The trial judge’s order 
was not final, and he was not functus, until supervision of the mandatory 
injunction was complete. He “was entitled to keep his judgment from 
becoming final, and to remain seized with jurisdiction, by the simple 
expedient of declaring that he was doing so.”255 Justice Freeman re-
jected the argument that courts should not make orders requiring ongo-
ing supervision, since parties can always apply to the courts for 
enforcement of an order.256 The case could have dragged on if the claim-
ants had to bring fresh proceedings every time the government appeared 
not to be using its best efforts, and delay could have undermined section 
23 rights since continued assimilation could have reduced the number of 
students below that required to exercise section 23 rights. Further, sec-
tion 23 imposes positive obligations on governments, which will bring 
                                                                                                                                
247 Doucet-Boudreau CA, id., at paras. 41-49, citing McLachlin C.J., supra, note 4, at 
554-55, 558-59. 
248 Justice Flinn also wrote that the reporting order could have impaired the harmonious 
relationship between the courts and the other branches of government: Doucet-Boudreau CA, 
id., at para. 51. 
249 Id., at para. 50. 
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251 Id., at para. 84. 
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will bring the courts, parties, and educational institutions into ongoing 
relationships.257 
(c) The Supreme Court of Canada 
The case was moot by the time it reached the Supreme Court of 
Canada, since all the schools had been built by then. Nonetheless, all 
members of the Court agreed that the case should be heard.258 Ulti-
mately, the reporting order was upheld by a narrow margin of five to 
four judges. Justices Iacobucci and Arbour wrote joint reasons for the 
majority which included McLachlin C.J.,259 while LeBel and Des-
champs JJ. wrote joint reasons on behalf of the dissenting judges.260  
The majority emphasized the need for a generous and expansive in-
terpretation of Charter remedies, rather than a narrow or technical ap-
proach that could undermine the full benefit and protection of Charter 
rights.261 They relied on McLachlin C.J.’s reasons in Dunedin262 for the 
proposition that section 24(1) must be interpreted in a broad and pur-
posive manner because it is a vital part of the Charter, it is a remedial 
provision, and its language confers broad discretion to craft remedies. A 
purposive approach is necessary since a right is only as meaningful as 
the remedy for its breach. This approach requires that: “First, the pur-
pose of the right being protected must be promoted: courts must craft 
responsive remedies. Second, the purpose of the remedies provision 
must be promoted: courts must craft effective remedies.”263  
                                                                                                                                
257 Id., at paras. 82-83, citing Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, [1990] S.C.J. No. 
19, at 365 [S.C.R.], per Dickson C.J. [hereinafter “Mahe”], and Bastarache, Education Rights 
of Provincial Official Language Minorities, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989), at 704.  
258 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, supra, note 14. The majority found at paras. 17-22 that the 
factors set out in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342, at 353-65, 
[1989] S.C.J. No. 14 favoured hearing the matter. There was a continuing adversarial context, 
the case raised important issues regarding the jurisdiction of superior courts to order remedies 
in Charter cases, and the issue fell squarely within the expertise and traditional role of the 
judiciary. The dissenting judges agreed at para. 95. 
259 Justices Gonthier and Bastarache concurred. 
260 Justices Major and Binnie concurred. 
261 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, supra, note 14, at paras. 23-24, citing R. v. Gamble, [1988] 
2 S.C.R. 595; R. v. Sarson, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 223, [1988] S.C.J. No. 87; and Dunedin, supra, 
note 15. 
262 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 24, citing Dunedin, id., at para. 18. 
263 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 25 (emphasis in original). 
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The majority and the dissenting judges agreed on the purpose and 
scope of the rights at stake.264 Section 23 is a means to preserve and 
promote French and English language and culture by ensuring each 
language flourishes in provinces where it is not that of the majority.265 It 
was also designed to correct past injustice by halting erosion and ac-
tively promoting minority official languages. This is a distinctively 
Canadian provision that imposes positive obligations on governments to 
provide resources, pass legislation, and develop institutional struc-
tures.266  
These rights are particularly vulnerable to government inaction or 
delay, since assimilation can increase to the point where the numbers no 
longer warrant minority language education. Therefore, the “affirmative 
promise contained in s. 23 of the Charter and the critical need for timely 
compliance will sometimes require courts to order affirmative remedies 
to guarantee that language rights are meaningfully, and therefore neces-
sarily promptly, protected.”267 
(d) The Dissenting Reasons 
While there was broad agreement on section 23 rights, the dissent-
ing judges held that the reporting order itself was void for three reasons. 
First, it was inconsistent with the principles of procedural fairness.268 
Since there are penalties for failure to comply with injunctions, the 
parties must be given proper notice of their obligations. The reporting 
order in this case failed to specify the nature, content, or format of the 
reports, or the procedural guidelines for the hearings.269  
The second reason the dissentients found the order void was that a 
court which purports to oversee implementation of a final order is acting 
when its jurisdiction is exhausted, in breach of the functus officio 
                                                                                                                                
264 Id., at paras. 91-147. 
265 Id., at para. 26, citing Mahe, supra, note 257, at 362, and Reference re Public 
Schools Act (Manitoba) s. 79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 839, [1993] S.C.J. No. 26, at 
849-50 [S.C.R.]. 
266 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 27. 
267 Id., at para. 29. 
268 Id., at para. 96. 
269 Id., at paras. 97-104. 
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doctrine.270 Functus officio means that a court has no jurisdiction to 
reopen or amend a final decision, unless there has been an error in draft-
ing the judgment or in expressing the intention of the court. The under-
lying rationale is that “there must be finality to a proceeding to ensure 
procedural fairness and the integrity of the judicial system.”271 The 
dissenting judges found the reporting requirement changed the final 
order when the trial judge was functus.  
The third reason they opposed the order was that a court overseeing 
or supervising implementation of its final order is attempting to extend 
its jurisdiction beyond its proper role, and is in breach of the separation 
of powers principle.272 They held that while there is no formal division 
of powers between the judicial, legislative, and executive branches of 
government, the separation of powers is entrenched in our Constitu-
tion.273 There is a clear distinction between the courts on one hand, and 
the closely intertwined legislative and executive branches on the 
other.274 Cooperation and mutual respect between the branches are at the 
core of the Canadian constitutional order.275 
The dissentients held that the separation of powers protects the in-
dependence of the judiciary and permits it to discharge its duties,276 
which are to declare what the law is, contribute to its development, and 
provide relief for breach of claimants’ rights.277 However, once a court 
issues a remedy under section 24(1), it should exercise restraint and 
presume that the government will act with reasonable diligence and in 
good faith to rectify the Charter defect, given our tradition of govern-
ment compliance with judicial interpretations of the law and court 
                                                                                                                                
270 Id., at para. 105. 
271 Id., at para. 114, citing Sopinka J. in Chandler v. Assn. of Architects (Alberta), su-
pra, note 240, at 861-62. 
272 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at paras. 105, 117. 
273 Id., at para. 107. 
274 Id., at para. 108, citing Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 68, and Fraser v. 
Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, [1985] S.C.J. No. 71, at 469-70 
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275 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 121, citing Vriend, supra, note 12. The dissenti-
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regarding the tradition of judicial restraint, cooperation among the branches of government, 
and the importance of institutional legitimacy. 
276 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 108, citing Provincial Judges Reference, supra, 
note 68, and Mackin, supra, note 10. 
277 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 106. 
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orders. The executive should retain autonomy to choose among policy 
alternatives that conform to the Charter.278 An injunction might be nec-
essary279 if it is the only way to vindicate a claimant’s rights, or if a 
government has upset the constitutional balance by ignoring less intru-
sive judicial measures. Otherwise, “increased judicial intervention in 
public administration will rarely be appropriate.”280  
In the dissenting judges’ view, there were alternatives such as expe-
dited contempt proceedings before another judge,281 and there was no 
suggestion that the government ignored less intrusive judicial meas-
ures.282 Instead, the trial judge assumed a supervisory and administrative 
function that properly belonged to the executive283 and was beyond the 
institutional capacity of the judiciary.284 Further, if the reporting hear-
ings were intended to put pressure on the government, they constituted 
political activity which is the function of the opposition party, not the 
courts.285 A construction deadline with the possibility of a contempt 
order would have provided as much incentive as the reporting hearings, 
without politicizing the relationship between the courts and the execu-
tive.286 The dissent concluded that the remedy was not appropriate and 
just since it was inconsistent with basic legal principles and constitu-
tional doctrines.287  
                                                                                                                                
278 Id., at paras. 123-24. Indeed, the courts have acknowledged that the legislatures and 
executive are in the best position to make these choices. 
279 Id., at para. 134. 
280 Id., at para. 140. 
281 Id., at paras. 136-37, citing Dunedin, supra, note 15, at para. 22. Note that the dis-
senting judges opined at para. 138 that it was difficult to imagine any circumstances in which 
breach of a party’s right to notice would assist in the vindication of the other party’s Charter 
rights. 
282 The dissenting judges found that the government did not know what its obligations 
were under s. 23 of the Charter, although the trial judge explicitly found that the real issue 
was when s. 23 requirements would be satisfied. 
283 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, supra, note 14, at para. 111. 
284 Id., at paras. 110, 120, citing Eldridge, supra, note 42, at para. 96. 
285 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 128. 
286 Id., at paras. 130-33, 143, citing Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 68, at 
paras. 139-40. As the dissenting judges put it at para. 132, “[i]f the reporting hearings were 
intended to hold ‘the Province’s feet to the fire’, the character of the relationship between the 
judiciary and the executive was improperly altered….” 
287 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at paras. 145, 147, citing Mills, supra, note 7, at 952-53. 
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(e) The Majority’s Decision 
The majority concluded that the trial judge’s reporting order mean-
ingfully protected and implemented the claimants’ section 23 rights 
while maintaining respect for the executive and legislative branches of 
government.288 Like the dissenting judges, they identified the key issue 
as the proper role of courts. They took note of the Canadian tradition 
and fundamental constitutional value of governments and private parties 
voluntarily complying with court orders. This is especially important 
when the courts must ensure that governments comply with the Consti-
tution, while observing the functional separation between the branches 
of government.289 The majority held that courts must be sensitive to 
their role, “and not fashion remedies which usurp the role of the other 
branches of governance by taking on tasks to which other persons or 
bodies are better suited.”290 However, “the boundaries of the courts’ 
proper role … cannot be reduced to a simple test or formula; it will vary 
according to the right at issue and the context of each case.”291  
The majority found that the nature and extent of the remedies avail-
able under section 24(1) may be limited by the wording of the provision, 
which must be read in harmony with the rest of the Constitution, and by 
other constitutional provisions.292 A section 24(1) remedy is available 
for government inaction, such as the failure to mobilize resources to 
provide section 23 school facilities in a timely manner.293 The language 
of section 24(1) confers a broad and unfettered discretion that cannot be 
reduced to a formula that is binding in all cases. Nor can this discretion 
be pre-empted or reduced by courts of appeal.294 A party challenging a 
Charter remedy granted by a section 96 court must establish that the 
remedy is not appropriate and just in the circumstances.  
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Unlike the dissenting judges, the majority held that since the reme-
dial power of the superior courts under section 24(1) is part of the Con-
stitution, which is the supreme law of Canada, it cannot be strictly 
limited by statutory or common law rules or principles such as judicial 
restraint, the dialogue theory, or the doctrine of functus officio. 
“[J]udicial restraint and metaphors such as ‘dialogue’ must not be ele-
vated to the level of strict constitutional rules to which the words of 
s. 24 can be subordinated.”295 However, these sources may be helpful in 
choosing a section 24 remedy insofar as they express principles that are 
relevant to what is appropriate and just in the circumstances.296 The 
court in a particular case must give meaning to these words. It must 
exercise its discretion on the basis of the nature of the right, the nature 
of the infringement, the facts of the case, and the relevant legal princi-
ples.297 The court should also take into account five broad considera-
tions in determining what remedy to grant.  
 
• First, the remedy must meaningfully vindicate the claimant’s Char-
ter rights taking into account the nature of the right and the claim-
ant’s situation. It “must be relevant to the experience of the claimant 
and must address the circumstances in which the right was infringed 
or denied.”298  
• Second, the remedy must be legitimate for a court in a constitutional 
democracy. It must respect the division of authority between the 
branches of government. The “courts must not … depart unduly or 
unnecessarily from their role of adjudicating disputes and granting 
remedies that address the matter of those disputes.”299  
• Third, the remedy must be “a judicial one which vindicates the right 
while invoking the function and powers of a court. It will not be ap-
propriate for a court to leap into the kinds of decisions and functions 
for which its design and expertise are manifestly unsuited.”300 The 
capacity and competence of courts can be partly inferred from their 
tasks, procedures, and precedents.  
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• Fourth, the remedy must not only vindicate the right of the claimant; 
it must also be fair to the party against whom it is made. It “should 
not impose substantial hardships that are unrelated to securing the 
right.”301  
• Finally, “the judicial approach to remedies must remain flexible and 
responsive to the needs of a given case.”302 Section 24 is part of a 
constitutional scheme to vindicate fundamental Charter rights, and 
its evolution may require novel and creative approaches that depart 
from traditional and historical practice.  
 
The majority concluded that the trial judge properly took into ac-
count the factual circumstances in exercising his remedial discretion. 
His reporting order satisfied the first guideline by meaningfully vindi-
cating the claimants’ section 23 Charter rights in a context of serious 
rates of assimilation that could further endanger linguistic rights, and a 
history of government delay in providing French language education. If 
there had not been reporting hearings, the claimants would have had to 
commence a new court proceeding whenever there was an additional 
delay, which would have taken considerable time and resources from 
people who had already invested a great deal to enforce their section 23 
rights. The majority found the trial judge’s pragmatic and expeditious 
approach was “a creative blending of remedies and processes already 
known to the courts in order to give life to the right in s. 23.”303  
The trial judge could have granted a declaration of the rights of the 
parties, but the rationale for such an order is that the government will 
comply promptly and fully. The general content of section 23 rights had 
already been settled in previous decisions, and the real issue in this case 
was the date when the programs and facilities would be implemented.304 
The majority held that “[w]here governments have failed to comply with 
their well-understood constitutional obligations to take positive action in 
support of the right in s. 23, the assumption underlying a preference for 
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declarations may be undermined.”305 The trial judge considered a decla-
ration, and was entitled to conclude it was not appropriate in this case. 
Further, the majority doubted the government would have been more 
respectful of contempt proceedings.306 They concluded it was appropri-
ate to grant the remedy that would lead to prompt compliance, and avoid 
the risk of additional procedural delay.307 
With respect to the second guideline, the majority held that the rem-
edy took into account, and did not unduly depart from the role of the 
courts in a constitutional democracy.308 The trial judge considered the 
government’s progress, preserved and reinforced its role in providing 
school facilities without compromising the parents’ rights, and built in 
some flexibility with a “best efforts” clause. The majority stated that 
“[t]o some extent, the legitimate role of the court vis-à-vis various insti-
tutions of government will depend on the circumstances.”309 In this case 
it was appropriate to craft a remedy that vindicated the rights of the 
parents but left detailed choices of means to the executive. The majority 
held that courts may clearly grant injunctions against governments, and 
that the power to do so “is central to s. 24(1) of the Charter which envi-
sions more than declarations of rights. Courts do take actions to ensure 
that rights are enforced, and not merely declared”;310 for example, with 
contempt proceedings, garnishments, and writs of seizure and sale. 
The third guideline was also met; the order was judicial in that it 
called upon functions and powers known to the courts, which often 
continue to be involved in the relationship between the parties. Superior 
courts have taken active managerial roles in exercising the traditional 
powers of courts of equity, and equitable remedies have been developed 
to support the litigation process such as Mareva injunctions and Anton 
Piller orders that preserve evidence and assets before trial. Courts have 
ongoing jurisdiction and supervisory powers in bankruptcy, receiver-
ship, trusts, estates, and family law matters, and where they have ordered 
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specific performance or issued mandatory injunctions. 311 In addition, 
the Supreme Court remained seized of the Manitoba Language Rights 
Reference during the implementation of constitutional language 
rights,312 and lower courts have retained jurisdiction in section 23 
cases.313  
The majority concluded that “the range of remedial orders available 
to courts in civil proceedings demonstrates that constitutional remedies 
involving some degree of ongoing supervision do not represent a radical 
break with the past practices of courts.”314 Under section 24(1) of the 
Charter, the flexibility of equitable remedies may be applied to orders 
requiring governments to vindicate constitutional rights. The reporting 
order in this case was not inconsistent with the judicial function;315 the 
trial judge was hearing evidence and supervising cross-examinations on 
progress reports, not managing and coordinating construction projects. 
The majority also found that while statutory and common law rules 
cannot pre-empt the remedial discretion conferred by section 24(1), the 
doctrine of functus officio addresses the functions and powers of courts, 
and is therefore useful in determining whether the order was appropri-
ately judicial.316 The functus doctrine applies when the judge’s function 
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has been exhausted, to ensure finality so that litigants have a stable base 
for an appeal. The majority found that the trial judge was not functus in 
this case. While he retained jurisdiction to hear progress reports, he did 
not retain authority to alter the final disposition on the scope and viola-
tion of section 23 rights or to modify the injunction,317 so he did not 
undermine the stable base from which to appeal.318 Further, rules of 
practice allow courts to vary their orders or provide additional relief to 
make them effective without undermining the right to appeal,319 and 
nothing in the Judicature Act prevented the trial judge from hearing 
reports on the implementation of an order.320 
With respect to the fourth guideline, the majority found that the re-
porting order was not unfair to the government. It was not so vaguely 
worded as to make it invalid. While the trial judge could have provided 
more guidance regarding what the parties could expect in the reporting 
hearings, his order was not incomprehensible or impossible to follow.321 
It clearly communicated that the government had to attend at court to 
report on the status of its efforts to provide the facilities and programs 
ordered at trial. However, the majority noted that similar orders in future 
cases should be more explicit and detailed with respect to the jurisdic-
tion retained by the trial judge and the procedure to be followed at re-
porting hearings. They noted that an alternative is to specify a timetable 
and permit the government to seek variation if it is appropriate and 
just.322  
The fifth guideline — that courts must issue responsive remedies 
which guarantee full and meaningful protection of Charter rights — may 
require novel remedies, especially for the enforcement of section 23 
rights. A superior court may issue any remedy it considers appropriate 
and just in the circumstances, but it should bear in mind its role as a 
constitutional arbiter and the limits of its institutional capacity. “Re-
viewing courts, for their part, must show considerable deference to trial 
judges’ choice of remedy, and should refrain from using hindsight to 
perfect a remedy. A reviewing court should only interfere where the trial 
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judge has committed an error of law or principle.”323 The claimants were 
awarded full costs on a solicitor-client basis throughout, including those 
of the reporting hearings, since they had been consistently denied their 
Charter rights by a province that was fully aware of the content of those 
rights.324 
4. Summary  
There has been little guidance on the interpretation of section 24(1). 
The leading cases are the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mills (1986),325 
Dunedin (2001),326 and Doucet-Boudreau SCC (2003).327 Justice McIn-
tyre held in Mills that the language of section 24(1) gives the courts a 
wide and unfettered discretion, which cannot be reduced to a binding 
formula that applies in all cases, or pre-empted by appellate courts. The 
remedy will vary depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, 
and the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal. 
In Dunedin, McLachlin C.J. added four propositions that inform the 
interpretation of section 24(1). First, this provision must be given a 
broad and purposive, or large and liberal interpretation. Second, it must 
be interpreted to provide full, effective, and meaningful remedies for 
Charter violations. Third, section 24(1) and section 24(2) must be read 
together, and a “court of competent jurisdiction” must be interpreted to 
produce just and workable results for both provisions. Fourth, these 
provisions should not be read so as to confer authority that courts and 
tribunals were never intended to have; courts must facilitate direct ac-
cess to appropriate and just remedies while respecting their existing 
structure and practice, and without intruding upon legislative powers. 
Doucet-Boudreau went further, since the trial judge appeared to in-
vade legislative and executive authority by requiring progress reports on 
the province’s efforts to fulfill his order to provide French language edu-
cational programs and facilities. The order raised the spectre of the Ameri-
can structural or administrative injunctions referred to in McLachlin 
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C.J.’s Weir Memorial Lecture; the trial judge was involved in the con-
struction of schools, down to the choice of ventilation systems. The 
government argued that the order was procedurally unfair since it did 
not provide sufficient notice of what was required at the reporting hear-
ings, the trial judge had no jurisdiction to hear reports because he was 
functus officio, and the Court breached the constitutional division of 
powers by intruding upon the enforcement functions of the legislative 
and executive branches of government. 
The majority upheld the trial judge’s reporting order. They found 
that the words “appropriate and just” must be given a broad, liberal, and 
flexible interpretation that promotes Charter rights and the purposes of 
section 24(1) by crafting responsive and effective remedies. Further, the 
principles of procedural fairness and judicial restraint, the doctrine of 
functus officio, and the dialogue theory cannot be raised to the level of 
constitutional principles that limit the interpretation of the section 24(1) 
remedial authority of a provincial superior court. However, the courts 
must be sensitive to their role under the Constitution, and not issue 
orders that usurp the functions of the executive and legislative branches 
of government. 
The majority in Doucet-Boudreau set out five broad guidelines that 
a court must keep in mind when it is issuing a remedy under section 
24(1) of the Charter. First, the remedy must vindicate the breach of 
Charter rights. Second, the court must be mindful of its traditional con-
stitutional role. Third, the remedy must be a judicial remedy. Fourth, it 
must be fair to the respondent. Fifth, remedies must remain flexible and 
responsive to the issues. The majority concluded that the reporting order 
was a creative blend of remedies and processes that were known to the 
courts and gave life to the claimants’ section 23 rights.  
VIII.  JURISDICTION TO GRANT REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 24(1) 
1. The Early Decisions  
Historically, superior courts had original jurisdiction to hear all 
cases regardless of the subject matter, while local courts had only the 
authority specifically conferred upon them by statute, and were subject 
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to review by superior courts if they exceeded their express jurisdiction. 
This structure continues today with the added constitutional restraint of 
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.328 The question is which of 
these statutory and superior courts qualify as courts of competent juris-
diction for the purpose of granting an appropriate and just remedy under 
section 24(1) for the breach of Charter rights arising from government 
action? 
The starting point is McIntyre J.’s statement in Mills,329 that “… a 
court is competent if it has jurisdiction, conferred by statute, over the 
person and the subject matter in question and, in addition, has authority 
to make the order sought.”330 In that case, a preliminary inquiry was not 
a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of granting a remedy 
under section 24(1). The judge’s sole function was to decide whether 
there was sufficient evidence to warrant committal for trial,331 and the 
Court had no jurisdiction to acquit, convict, impose a penalty, grant a 
remedy, or hear and determine questions regarding infringement of 
Charter rights.332 Therefore, the Court could not address the section 
11(b) Charter issue, which had to be heard by the trial judge. 
The Supreme Court also held in Mills that the trial court is usually 
the court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of section 24(1) 
because it has jurisdiction, independent of the Charter, over the person 
and the subject, as well as authority to grant a full range of criminal law 
remedies. The trial judge also has an extensive factual basis upon which 
to decide a Charter issue.333 In addition, a superior court has concurrent 
original jurisdiction to remedy Charter breaches, and discretion to de-
cline to exercise that jurisdiction. This is the appropriate court to address 
Charter issues where an accused person has not made an election and no 
trial court has been established, or where the trial judge caused the vio-
lation of the constitutional right.334  
                                                                                                                                
328 I do not address the jurisdiction of the Federal Court in this paper. 
329 Supra, note 7. 
330 Id., at 960. As noted above, McIntyre J. adopted the Ontario Court of Appeal’s ap-
proach in R. v. Morgentaler, supra, note 50, at 271, and the other members of the Court 
agreed. See Lamer J., at 890 and La Forest J., at 971. 
331 Mills, id., Lamer J., at 889 and La Forest J., at 970. 
332 Id., McIntyre J., at 954. 
333 Id., McIntyre J., at 955, Lamer J., at 903-904, and La Forest J., at 971. 
334 Id., Lamer J., at 904, McIntyre J. at 956, and La Forest J., at 972. Justice McIntyre 
stated, at 956, that this concurrent original jurisdiction is found in the provisions of the 
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The circumstances in which an accused should apply to the superior 
court were addressed in Rahey and in Smith,335 both of which involved 
complaints of delay. In Rahey, a Provincial Court judge heard evidence 
and the accused’s application for a directed verdict. He then adjourned 
for eleven months and rendered judgment only after the Crown and the 
accused applied separately to the superior court for relief. Justice Lamer, 
writing for the majority in the Supreme Court, repeated that a trial court 
is generally the appropriate forum in which to seek a remedy under 
section 24(1), although superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction.  
Further, superior courts should not exercise jurisdiction unless they 
are better suited to assess the claim and grant a remedy in a particular 
case; for example, where no trial court has been established and a rem-
edy is needed on a timely basis, and where the lower court process in-
fringes the accused’s Charter rights.336 In Rahey the superior court 
properly exercised jurisdiction because the trial judge was responsible 
for the delay. 
The superior court also properly agreed to hear an application for a 
stay of proceedings in Smith, since the accused’s preliminary inquiry 
had been delayed for eleven months, and was scheduled to begin in 
another four months. The unanimous Supreme Court reiterated that trial 
judges generally should deal with section 11(b) Charter violations. 
However, the superior court was the appropriate forum in this case, 
since the preliminary hearing judge was not a court of competent juris-
diction under section 24(1). If the accused had been committed for trial 
at the preliminary inquiry, further delay would have ensued before a 
trial judge could have addressed the issue.337 
                                                                                                                                
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34; now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 which embody the essential 
historical features of the original Court of Kings’s Bench in England. 
335 Both supra, note 96. 
336 Rahey, id., at 603-604. The burden is on the claimant to establish that the application 
is appropriate for the superior court’s consideration. 
337 See also Seaboyer, supra, note 96, in which the majority held that preliminary in-
quiry judges do not have jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of legislation 
because the Criminal Code does not authorize them to deal with constitutional questions. 
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2. Administrative Tribunals under Section 24(1) 
The approach in Mills has been applied to administrative tribunals 
that have exclusive initial jurisdiction with respect to particular matters. 
For example, in Weber v. Ontario Hydro,338 an employee filed griev-
ances under a collective agreement, and commenced an action in the 
superior court claiming damages and a declaration for breach of Charter 
rights. Justice McLachlin, for the majority, held that the arbitrator satis-
fied the Mills test and constituted a court of competent jurisdiction un-
der section 24(1) of the Charter; he had jurisdiction over the parties and 
the dispute under the collective agreement, as well as power to apply the 
law including the Charter, and he had authority to award damages and a 
declaration. Therefore, he had exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of 
the dispute, and the court could not entertain a parallel action.339 
However, the Supreme Court found that the National Parole Board 
was not a section 24 court in Mooring v. Canada (National Parole 
Board).340 An inmate who had been released from prison on mandatory 
supervision was charged with several offences. Even though the charges 
were stayed, the Board revoked his statutory release. Justice Sopinka, 
for the majority, concluded that the Board was not a court of competent 
jurisdiction for the purpose of excluding evidence, given its structure 
and function, as well as the language of its constituent statute.341 The 
Board did not act in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner. Its members did 
not have to be legally trained, and it held inquisitorial hearings where 
counsel served a limited function. Its process was substantially different 
from that of a traditional court; for example, the rules of proof and evi-
dence did not apply, and the Board did not have authority to issue sub-
poenas. Further, the enabling statute342 conferred a broad mandate to 
take all available relevant information into account, particularly factors 
concerning the protection of society. Therefore, “… neither the Board 
                                                                                                                                
338 Supra, note 154.   
339 Id., at paras. 55-56. See also para. 67, where the majority held that if a remedy was 
required that was beyond the arbitrators’ authority, his jurisdiction was subject to the residual 
discretionary power of a court of inherent jurisdiction to grant remedies that a statutory 
tribunal could not grant. 
340 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75, [1996] S.C.J. No. 10. 
341 Id., at para. 24. 
342 Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20. 
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itself nor the proceedings … [were] designed to engage in the balancing 
of factors that s. 24(2) demands.”343 
3. The Functional and Structural Test in Dunedin 
The jurisdiction of statutory criminal courts was considered in the 
companion cases of Hynes and Dunedin.344 The lead decision is Dune-
din, in which McLachlin C.J. concluded on behalf of the unanimous 
Court that a justice of the peace presiding at a trial under the Provincial 
Offences Act (POA) had authority to order legal costs against the Crown 
for breaching the accused’s Charter rights by failing to make full disclo-
sure of evidence. The starting point was the Mills test, that a section 24 
court must have jurisdiction with respect to the subject matter, the per-
son, and the remedy sought.345 Chief Justice McLachlin added a “func-
tional and structural” approach for determining if a statutory court or 
administrative tribunal has jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought.  
The central question “is whether the legislator endowed the court or 
tribunal with the power to pronounce on Charter rights and to grant the 
remedy sought for the breach of these rights.”346 Statutory bodies have 
only the remedial powers that are expressly or impliedly granted to them 
by their enabling legislation.347 Since most courts and tribunals were 
established before the Charter was enacted, they generally will not have 
express power to grant Charter remedies.348 Consequently, the question 
becomes whether the court or tribunal is an appropriate forum for order-
ing the Charter remedy given its function and structure. “If so, it can 
reasonably be inferred … that the legislature intended the court or tribunal 
                                                                                                                                
343 Supra, note 340, at para. 26. 
344 Both supra, note 15. These cases were released on December 6, 2001. 
345 Chief Justice McLachlin found that there are four related propositions which inform 
the interpretation of s. 24(1), as discussed in text accompanying footnotes 212-215 above. 
Essentially, s. 24(1) and s. 24(2) must be read harmoniously together, and be given a broad 
interpretation that facilitates access to an effective remedy, while respecting the existing court 
structure and the role of the legislatures in prescribing jurisdiction.  
346 Dunedin, supra, note 15, at para. 25. 
347 Id., at para. 26, citing R. v. Doyle, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 597, at 602; Macauley & Spra-
gue, Practice and Procedure Before Administrative Tribunals, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 
1988), Vol. 3, at 23-17 et seq. 
348 Dunedin, id., at para. 27. 
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to have this remedy at its disposal when confronted with Charter viola-
tions that arise in the course of its proceedings.”349 
Put another way, if the legislature confers a function on a decision 
maker that engages Charter issues, and it provides the decision maker 
with procedures and processes that are capable of resolving these issues 
in a fair and just manner, the presumption is that the legislature intended 
the decision maker to exercise this power.350 The question is “whether 
the court or tribunal … is suited to grant the remedy sought under s. 24 
in light of its function and structure.”351 This requires a contextual as-
sessment, and the weight of the relevant factors will vary depending on 
the circumstances.  
The function refers to the decision maker’s purpose or mandate. 
“First, what is the court or tribunal’s function within the legislative 
scheme? Would jurisdiction to order the remedy … frustrate or enhance 
this role? How essential is the power to grant the remedy … to the effec-
tive and efficient functioning of the court or tribunal? Second, what is 
the function of the court or tribunal in the broader legal system? Is it 
more appropriate that a different forum redress the violation of Charter 
rights?”352  
The structure of the decision maker deals with the compatibility of 
the institution and its processes with the remedy sought under section 
24. The following operational factors may be salient depending upon the 
remedy sought: “…whether the proceedings are judicial or quasi-
judicial; the role of counsel; the applicability or otherwise of traditional 
rules of proof and evidence; whether the court or tribunal can issue 
subpoenas; whether evidence is offered under oath; the expertise and 
training of the decision-maker; and the institutional experience of the 
court or tribunal with the remedy in question … the workload of the 
court or tribunal, the time constraints it operates under, [and] its ability 
to compile an adequate record for a reviewing court…”353 
The question comes down to whether the legislature has given the 
decision maker the tools that are needed to fashion the remedy sought 
under section 24 in a just, fair and consistent manner, without under-
                                                                                                                                
349 Id., at para. 35. 
350 Id., at para. 36. See also para. 75. 
351 Id., at para. 43 (emphasis in original). 
352 Id., at para. 44. 
353 Id., at para. 45. 
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mining its ability to perform its function.354 Administrative tribunals 
raise difficult issues since their structure and functions vary widely. 
Consequently, a tribunal’s constituent statute must be carefully re-
viewed, particularly with respect to the power to grant remedies.355 
Another critical factor is whether the tribunal has the necessary safe-
guards that permit it to make fair and informed decisions on Charter 
rights, and to award remedies for breach of these rights.356  
Chief Justice McLachlin found that the functional and structural ap-
proach was consistent with the authorities — particularly Mills, We-
ber,357 and Mooring358 — which were dominated by the concern for 
function and structure.359 It was also consistent with the pre-Martin test 
for whether administrative tribunals had authority to entertain chal-
lenges to their constituent legislation under section 52(1),360 and with 
the principles underlying section 24 in that it balanced meaningful ac-
cess to Charter relief with deference to the role of the legislatures.361 
“Whether … the legislature intended to exclude a particular remedial 
power is determined by reference to the function the legislature has 
asked the tribunal to perform and the powers and processes with which 
it has furnished it.”362   
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded that provincial offences courts 
have jurisdiction to award costs under section 24(1) as a remedy for 
breach of the Charter right to timely disclosure. They are quasi-criminal 
                                                                                                                                
354 Id. 
355 Id., at paras. 65-66. See also paras. 70-71 where McLachlin C.J. stated that a statu-
tory court or tribunal has both the powers expressly conferred by its enabling legislation and 
the implied powers that are required as a matter of practical necessity to effectively and 
efficiently perform its intended functions. See Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-
Television & Telecommunications Commission), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722, [1989] S.C.J. No. 68; 
Reference re National Energy Board Act, [1986] 3 F.C. 275, [1986] F.C.J. No. 423 (C.A.); 
and Interprovincial Pipe Line Ltd. v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1978] 1 F.C. 601 
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356 Dunedin, id., at para. 67. 
357 Supra, note 154. 
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359 Dunedin, supra, note 15, at para. 68. 
360 The test was whether the legislature intended to give the tribunal the power to inter-
pret and apply the Charter, which could be implied from the structure of the enabling legisla-
tion, the powers and functions of the tribunal, and the context in which it operated. 
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362 Id., at para. 75. 
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courts that have the necessary information to craft a remedy, and a full 
complement of criminal law remedial powers. Judicial standards, proc-
esses, and evidentiary rules apply at the hearing, and the decisions are 
subject to appeal. There is also a direct connection between cost awards 
for untimely disclosure and the function of a provincial offences court. 
If the procedure was bifurcated and costs were left to a superior court, 
the Charter claimant might be deprived of any remedy at all.363 
The functional and structural test set out in Dunedin was applied in 
the companion case of Hynes.364 Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a 
five-judge majority, held that a preliminary inquiry judge did not have 
authority under section 24(2) to exclude statements obtained in violation 
of the accused’s Charter rights. Mills held that a preliminary inquiry 
serves a limited screening function and that the presiding judge does not 
have jurisdiction to order a stay of proceedings, consider Charter ques-
tions, or grant Charter remedies including exclusion of evidence.365  
Nevertheless, the majority reconsidered the issue under the func-
tional and structural test in Dunedin, which was summarized as follows. 
The starting point for identifying a court of competent jurisdiction is the 
Mills test; the decision maker must have jurisdiction over the person and 
the subject matter, as well as authority to grant the remedy sought. With 
respect to remedial authority, the “question in all cases is whether … the 
legislature intended to empower the court or tribunal to make rulings on 
Charter violations that arise incidentally to their proceedings, and to 
grant the remedy sought as a remedy for such violations.”366 If the legis-
lation does not expressly confer authority to grant remedies for Charter 
infringements, the court must consider whether the decision maker is 
suited to grant the remedy given its function and structure.367 
Since the Criminal Code does not expressly confer authority on pre-
liminary inquiry courts to grant remedies under section 24, the question 
became whether the court was suited to grant the remedy of excluding 
evidence in light of its function and structure. The primary function of a 
preliminary inquiry court is to decide whether there is enough evidence 
                                                                                                                                
363 Id., at paras. 77-98. 
364 Supra, note 15. 
365 Id., at paras. 17-22, citing McIntyre J. in Mills, supra, note 7, at 954-55, and La For-
est J., at 970-71. This view was affirmed in Seaboyer, supra, note 96, at 638-39. 
366 Id., at para. 26. 
367 Id., at para. 27. 
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to commit the accused for trial. Its ancillary function, which has devel-
oped over time, is discovery of the Crown’s case.368 Its structure, proc-
esses, and evidentiary rules are similar to those of a trial court, and 
involuntary statements may be excluded at the preliminary inquiry un-
der the common law confessions rule. 
However, a preliminary inquiry court does not have the powers of a 
trial court. In particular, the judge has no authority to grant remedies or 
to exclude evidence under the Charter. The majority held that to confer 
this authority would change the role of the preliminary inquiry from an 
expeditious preliminary screening process to a forum for trying Charter 
issues with the attendant costs and delays. The exclusion of involuntary 
statements is a limited and discrete inquiry, whereas a decision to ex-
clude evidence under section 24(2) is based on the full factual context 
and the impact of the decision on the fairness of the trial and the admini-
stration of justice. The majority concluded that Parliament intended 
Charter issues to be resolved at trial when all the relevant circumstances 
can be weighed by the judge.369  
4.  Doucet-Boudreau 
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on courts of com-
petent jurisdiction under section 24 of the Charter is found in 
Doucet-Boudreau.370 As noted above, the primary issue was whether a 
superior court judge could retain jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the 
Charter to hear periodic progress reports on efforts to fulfill his order 
requiring the province to provide French programs and educational 
facilities by specified dates. There was no issue of unconstitutional 
legislation, or of government action; rather, the problem was government 
                                                                                                                                
368 Id., at paras. 30-31. 
369 Id., at paras. 37-50; note that Major J., for the dissenting judges Iacobucci, Binnie, 
and Arbour JJ., reached the opposite conclusion. In his view, Mills should have been over-
ruled to the extent that it prevented exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) by preliminary 
inquiry judges. He considered the s. 24 inquiry to be similar to voluntariness issues, and 
based on the same factors and rationale for exclusion. In his view, the discovery function of 
the preliminary inquiry is appropriate for making the determination to exclude evidence under 
s. 24. Further, there was no basis for concerns about costs and delay; indeed, it was wasteful 
not to have these decisions made at this level where Charter issues routinely arise. 
370 Supra, note 14. 
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inaction through failure to mobilize resources and provide school facili-
ties in a timely manner.  
The majority held that a remedy is available under section 24(1) for 
government inaction, as well as for government action that breaches 
Charter rights.371 Section 24(1) guarantees that there will always be a 
court of competent jurisdiction to hear and grant a remedy to a person 
whose Charter rights have been infringed. The default court is the pro-
vincial superior court established by section 96 of the Constitution Act, 
1867. Nothing in section 96, or in the jurisprudence describing the func-
tions of section 96 courts, limits the inherent jurisdiction of the superior 
courts or the statutory jurisdiction that can be conferred on them.372 Nor 
did the decisions in Mills and Dunedin have any impact, since they dealt 
with the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals or judges acting under 
statutory authority, where the issue is what power the legislator intended 
the tribunal to have under the Charter given the tribunal’s function and 
structure.373 The Mills test does not apply to section 96 superior courts 
since they were not created by statute, and they always “retain ‘constant, 
complete, and concurrent jurisdiction’ to issue remedies under s. 24(1).”374  
5. Summary 
Section 24(1) guarantees that there will always be a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction to hear and grant a remedy to a person whose Charter 
rights have been infringed. The question of whether a particular decision 
maker has authority to grant a remedy under section 24(1) is especially 
                                                                                                                                
371 Id., at para. 43. 
372 Id., at paras. 45-46. This body of law establishes the principle that core superior 
court jurisdiction cannot be transferred exclusively to provincial courts or administrative 
tribunals. See, for example, Reference re Residential Tenancies Act (Ontario), 1979, [1981] 1 
S.C.R. 714.  
373 Doucet-Boudreau SCC, id., at para. 48. 
374 Id., at para. 49, citing Mills, supra, note 7, at 892, 956; Rahey, supra, note 96, at 
603-604; and Smith, supra, note 96, at 1129-30. See also Paul, supra, note 180, at para. 40, 
where the Court held that Tétreault-Gadoury, supra, note 110, at para. 31, recognized “that 
the power to find a statutory provision of no effect, by virtue of s. 52(1)… is distinct from the 
remedial power to invoke s. 24(1) … In other words, an inferior court’s remedial powers are 
not determinative of its jurisdiction to hear and determine constitutional issues.” However, 
the case is of limited assistance since it involved s. 35 aboriginal rights, which are not part of 
the Charter, so that s. 24(1) was not engaged. 
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sensitive where statutory criminal courts and administrative tribunals are 
concerned. A section 24 remedy is available for government inaction as 
well as for government action that breaches Charter rights.  
The Mills test is the starting point; a court of competent jurisdiction 
within the meaning of section 24 must have jurisdiction, independent of 
the Charter, over the person and the subject matter, and authority to 
make the order sought. In Dunedin the Court articulated a “functional 
and structural” approach for determining if a decision maker has juris-
diction to grant a section 24 remedy. If legislation does not expressly 
confer authority to grant remedies for Charter infringements, the court 
must consider whether the decision maker is suited to grant the remedy 
sought in light of its function and structure.  
“Function” refers to the decision maker’s mandate or role, including 
its function within the legal system, whether power to grant a section 24 
remedy would undermine that role, and whether there is a more appro-
priate forum to remedy Charter violations. “Structure” refers to whether 
the decision maker and its operational processes are compatible with 
granting the remedy sought, taking into account the features of a judicial 
or quasi-judicial body. In essence, the question is whether the legislature 
has given the court or tribunal the tools that are necessary to craft the 
remedy sought in a just, fair, and consistent manner without undermin-
ing its ability to perform its function.  
Preliminary inquiry courts do not meet these requirements because 
of their limited statutory jurisdiction. However, a trial court, including a 
provincial offences court, does qualify as a section 24 court. The default 
court is the provincial superior court which has concurrent original 
jurisdiction to remedy Charter breaches, and discretion to decline to 
exercise that jurisdiction. The Mills test does not apply to section 96 
superior courts since they are courts of inherent jurisdiction that were 
not created by statute, and they always retain constant, complete, and 
concurrent jurisdiction to issue remedies under section 24(1). A superior 
court should generally leave Charter issues to the trial court in the 
criminal process, unless no trial court has been established, or the trial 
court itself is responsible for the violation of the accused’s Charter 
rights. 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
In her 1990 Weir Memorial Lecture, McLachlin C.J. discussed the 
institutional challenges that courts faced in exercising their authority 
under the Charter. When it came to remedies, the question was how the 
courts could ensure their orders would be enforced. What would happen 
if a court found that a law was unconstitutional or that government ac-
tion infringed a person’s Charter rights, and the government did nothing 
to respond? One answer in the United States was that courts issued 
structural injunctions to enforce civil rights, and became public adminis-
trators in the process. Chief Justice McLachlin cautioned against this 
solution, given the pitched battle that ensued between the American 
judiciary and the other branches of government.  
In her view, the Canadian answer was to be found in the tradition of 
judicial restraint, and in continued cooperation and mutual respect be-
tween the courts and governments. The Court maintained from the be-
ginning that it has explicit authority to make decisions regarding the 
Charter, but it will not overstep its institutional competence by second-
guessing policy decisions that governments are better able to make. For 
their part, legislatures have reacted to court decisions striking down 
legislation, by enacting new laws that achieve the same objective, but 
with added safeguards that protect Charter rights as interpreted by the 
courts. This is the essence of the dialogue theory, which provided a 
working model of the relationship between the judiciary and legislatures 
under the Charter built on democratic principles and the traditions iden-
tified by the Chief Justice.  
There is little controversy over the remedial powers and jurisdiction 
of provincial superior courts, but the reality is that most of Canada’s 
legal business takes place before statutory courts and administrative 
tribunals that have only the authority conferred upon them by legisla-
tion. These decision makers come in all shapes and sizes, with varying 
mandates and vastly different levels of expertise. No matter what statu-
tory authority the court or tribunal may have, the same policy concern 
arises: Charter rights belong to the people of Canada, and the people 
must be permitted to rely on these rights and raise them at the earliest 
possible stage of legal proceedings. 
This is the context or background against which we must consider 
how much progress Canadian courts have made with respect to remedies 
for breach of Charter rights. Remedies are not simply a procedural issue 
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for litigation counsel; they are a litmus test for our progress under the 
Charter as a whole. Elegant theories of substantive rights achieve little if 
we do not have adequate remedies to enforce them. As McLachlin C.J. 
said, “[w]ithout effective remedies, the law becomes an empty symbol; 
full of sound and fury but signifying nothing.”375 
When section 52(1) and section 24(1) were introduced in 1982, it 
appeared that section 52(1) simply stated the principle of constitutional 
supremacy, while section 24(1) provided for remedies without specify-
ing what they would be or which bodies could grant them. However, 
section 52(1) was quickly interpreted as authority for bodies that were 
clearly not courts of competent jurisdiction to address Charter issues. 
The range of remedies that are available under section 52(1) was estab-
lished fairly early in the Schachter decision. However, it took consider-
able time, and some deviations in direction, to arrive at the Martin 
guidelines for determining which bodies have jurisdiction to make deci-
sions under section 52(1).  
It has taken longer to develop general principles and guidelines un-
der section 24(1). The principle that a section 24(1) court must have 
jurisdiction over the person, the subject matter, and the remedy was 
established in the Mills decision in 1986, but it did not provide much 
assistance. Some progress was made with the “functional and structural 
approach” set out in Dunedin in 2001, but the most significant advances 
were not made until the Doucet-Boudreau decision was released late in 
2003.  
Two conclusions become apparent. First, Canadian remedial juris-
prudence has moved to a point where superior courts may issue struc-
tural injunctions without the conflict that was experienced in the United 
States. The reporting order in Doucet-Boudreau requiring progress re-
ports on the government’s efforts to fulfill the trial judge’s order mir-
rored the American remedies addressed by Chief Justice McLachlin in 
1990. In effect, the trial judge was involved in the construction of 
schools, right down to the choice of ventilation systems. The order 
worked through voluntary compliance, even though the government 
believed that the trial judge did not have jurisdiction to make the order. 
Programs and schools were delivered on schedule, and a long overdue 
promise to give life to section 23 minority language rights was fulfilled.  
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In her Weir Memorial Lecture, McLachlin C.J. said there “can be no 
doubt that the Charter poses new and unprecedented problems for the 
courts … in fashioning remedies which will at once be effective and 
respectful of the powers of other branches of government. We can fol-
low the route of confrontation, which has so often prevailed in the 
United States. Or we can continue down the road of mutual deference 
and cooperation between the judiciary and the legislatures upon which 
we seem to have embarked … my hope lies with the latter.”376 As it 
turns out, her words were prophetic. The concept of judicial restraint 
and the tradition of mutual deference and cooperation have evolved in 
the fourteen years since this lecture was delivered, but they remain the 
key to the decision in Doucet-Boudreau.  
The second conclusion which emerges from this discussion is that 
we do not yet have a cohesive set of jurisdictional principles and reme-
dial guidelines which will ensure that a person whose Charter rights 
have been infringed will be granted a just and appropriate remedy in an 
expeditious manner. While there have been substantial developments in 
this area, especially in the past year, there are gaps in the law. In particu-
lar, statutory courts and administrative tribunals that have the duty to 
abide by and apply the Constitution do not have the authority to grant 
remedies that will do justice to a claimant. Consequently, decision mak-
ers that routinely deal with Charter issues cannot provide adequate re-
lief, and claimants must either look to another forum for redress or go 
without. The courts cannot provide a complete solution since the legisla-
tures have exclusive authority to assign the jurisdiction of courts and 
tribunals. However, the courts can point out the problem and urge the 
legislatures to take up the issue in a manner that respects the division of 
powers among the branches of government. 
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